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Abstract
This thesis presents some contributions to the field of Health-Aware Control (HAC) of
dynamic systems.
In the first part of this thesis, a review of the concepts and methodologies related to reli-
ability versus degradation and fault tolerant control versus health-aware control is pre-
sented. Firstly, in an attempt to unify concepts, an overview of HAC, degradation, and
reliability modeling including some of the most relevant theoretical and applied contri-
butions is given.
Moreover, reliability modeling is formalized and exemplified using the structure func-
tion, Bayesian networks (BNs) and Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs) as modeling
tools in reliability analysis. In addition, some Reliability Importance Measures (RIMs)
are presented.
In particular, this thesis develops BNs models for overall system reliability analysis by
using Bayesian inference techniques. Bayesian networks are powerful tools in system re-
liability assessment due to their flexibility in modeling the reliability structure of complex
systems.
For the HAC scheme implementation, this thesis presents and discusses the integration
of actuators health information by means of RIMs and degradation in Model Predictive
Control (MPC) and Linear Quadratic Regulator algorithms.
In the proposed strategies, the cost function parameters are tuned using RIMs. The
methodology is able to avoid the occurrence of catastrophic and incipient faults by mon-
itoring the overall system reliability.
The proposed HAC strategies are applied to a Drinking Water Network (DWN) and a
multirotor UAV system. Moreover, a third approach, which uses MPC and restricts the
degradation of the system components is applied to a twin rotor system.
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Finally, this thesis presents and discusses two reliability interpretations. These interpreta-
tions, namely instantaneous and expected, differ in the manner how reliability is evaluated
and how its evolution along time is considered. This comparison is made within a HAC
framework and studies the system reliability under both approaches.
Keywords: prognostics and health-management, health-aware control, reliability anal-
ysis, reliability importance measures, Bayesian networks, Dynamic Bayesian Networks,
model predictive control, linear quadratic regulator, drinking water networks, octorotor
Resum
Aquesta tesi presenta algunes contribucions al camp del control basat en la salut dels
components "Health-Aware Control"(HAC) de sistemes dinàmics.
A la primera part d’aquesta tesi, es presenta una revisió dels conceptes i meto-dologies re-
lacionats amb la fiabilitat versus degradació, el control tolerant a fallades versus el HAC.
En primer lloc, i per unificar els conceptes, s’introdueixen els conceptes de degradació i
fiabilitat, models de fiabilitat i de HAC incloent algunes de les contribucions teòriques i
aplicades més rellevants.
La tesi, a més, el modelatge de la fiabilitat es formalitza i exemplifica utilitzant la funció
d’estructura del sistema, xarxes bayesianes (BN) i xarxes bayesianes dinàmiques (DBN)
com a eines de modelat i anàlisi de la fiabilitat com també presenta algunes mesures
d’importància de la fiabilitat (RIMs).
En particular, aquesta tesi desenvolupa models de BNs per a l’anàlisi de la fiabilitat del
sistema a través de l’ús de tècniques d’inferència bayesiana. Les xarxes bayesianes són
eines poderoses en l’avaluació de la fiabilitat del sistema gràcies a la seva flexibilitat en el
modelat de la fiabilitat de sistemes complexos.
Per a la implementació de l’esquema de HAC, aquesta tesi presenta i discuteix la inte-
gració de la informació sobre la salut i degradació dels actuadors mitjançant les RIMs en
algoritmes de control predictiu basat en models (MPC) i control lineal quadràtic (LQR).
En les estratègies proposades, els paràmetres de la funció de cost s’ajusten uti-litzant
els RIMs. Aquestes técniques de control fiable permetran millorar la disponibilitat i la
seguretat dels sistemes evitant l’aparició de fallades a través de la incorporació d’aquesta
informació de la salut dels components en l’algoritme de control.
Les estratègies de HAC proposades s’apliquen a una xarxa d’aigua potable (DWN) i a
un sistema UAV multirrotor. A més, un tercer enfocament fent servir la degradació dels
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actuadors com a restricció dins l’algoritme de control MPC s’aplica a un sistema aeri a
dos graus de llibertat (TRMS).
Finalment, aquesta tesi també presenta i discuteix dues interpretacions de la fiabilitat.
Aquestes interpretacions, nomenades instantània i esperada, difereixen en la forma en què
s’avalua la fiabilitat i com es considera la seva evolució al llarg del temps. Aquesta com-
paració es realitza en el marc del control HAC i estudia la fiabilitat del sistema en tots dos
enfocaments.
Resumen
Esta tesis presenta algunas contribuciones en el campo del control basado en la salud de
los componentes “Health-Aware Control” (HAC) de sistemas dinámicos.
En la primera parte de esta tesis, se presenta una revisión de los conceptos y metodolo-
gías relacionados con la fiabilidad versus degradación, el control tolerante a fallos versus
el HAC. En primer lugar, y para unificar los conceptos, se introducen los conceptos de
degradación y fiabilidad, modelos de fiabilidad y de HAC incluyendo algunas de las
contribuciones teóricas y aplicadas más relevantes.
La tesis, demás formaliza y ejemplifica el modelado de fiabilidad utilizando la función
de estructura del sistema, redes bayesianas (BN) y redes bayesianas diná-micas (DBN)
como herramientas de modelado y análisis de fiabilidad como también presenta algunas
medidas de importancia de la fiabilidad (RIMs).
En particular, esta tesis desarrolla modelos de BNs para el análisis de la fiabilidad del
sistema a través del uso de técnicas de inferencia bayesiana. Las redes bayesianas son
herramientas poderosas en la evaluación de la fiabilidad del sistema gracias a su flexibi-
lidad en el modelado de la fiabilidad de sistemas complejos.
Para la implementación del esquema de HAC, esta tesis presenta y discute la integración
de la información sobre la salud y degradación de los actuadores mediante las RIMs en
algoritmos de control predictivo basado en modelos (MPC) y del control cuadrático lineal
(LQR).
En las estrategias propuestas, los parámetros de la función de coste se ajustan utilizando
las RIMs. Estas técnicas de control fiable permitirán mejorar la disponibilidad y la segu-
ridad de los sistemas evitando la aparición de fallos a través de la incorporación de la
información de la salud de los componentes en el algoritmo de control.
Las estrategias de HAC propuestas se aplican a una red de agua potable (DWN) y a
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un sistema UAV multirotor. Además, un tercer enfoque que usa la degradación de los
actuadores como restricción en el algoritmo de control MPC se aplica a un sistema aéreo
con dos grados de libertad (TRMS).
Finalmente, esta tesis también presenta y discute dos interpretaciones de la fiabilidad. Es-
tas interpretaciones, llamadas instantánea y esperada, difieren en la forma en que se evalúa
la fiabilidad y cómo se considera su evolución a lo largo del tiempo. Esta comparación
se realiza en el marco del control HAC y estudia la fiabilidad del sistema en ambos enfo-
ques.
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Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
1.1.1 Degradation vs. Reliability
The degradation of physical components in engineering systems is generally inevitable,
in view of factors such as wear due to usage, aging of the materials and hostile environ-
mental conditions. In particular, the degradation of actuators in a closed-loop control
system can lead to poor performance and sometimes to a loss of controllability when the
level of degradation increases and the actuator reduces its capabilities such as speed re-
sponse, force, pressure, strength, etc; or becomes prone to faults when its degradation
level reaches or goes beyond a certain safe level, known also as failure threshold or criti-
cal value [185].
There exist two types of degradation: natural and forced degradation. On the one hand,
natural degradation is an age- or time-dependent internal process where components
gradually degrade, leading to their failure or breakdown. On the other hand, the forced
degradation is artificially induced by an external agent, where component loading grad-
ually increases in response to an increased demand [16, p. 32, 37, 52]. Such degradation
can be characterized into three categories: binary, degradation with a finite number of
levels, and degradation with an infinite number of levels [105].
The health of system components is of primordial importance for the safety and reliability
of the controlled system. Reliability prediction based on degradation modeling can be an
efficient method to estimate the health for some highly reliable components or systems
where observations of failures are uncommon. Thus, to avoid failures it is important
to enhance system safety by taking into consideration the degradation of components
health in the controller design [73, 124].
As fault and failure concepts are used in different fields such as reliability, safety, and
1
Chapter 1. Introduction 2
fault-tolerant systems, in different technological areas, their terminological use is not uni-
form. In this thesis, the definition given by [60] is used.
Definition 1.1. Fault: A fault is an impermissible deviation of at least one characteristic
property (feature) of the system from the acceptable, usual, standard condition.
Definition 1.2. Failure: A failure is a permanent interruption of a system ability to per-
form a required function under specified operating conditions.
Recently, the interest of the research on performance degradation in control system de-
sign has increased [22, 41, 126, 189]. If the design objective is still to maintain the original
system performance, this may force the remaining components to work beyond their nor-
mal service level to compensate for the handicaps caused by the degraded ones. There-
fore, the trade-off between achievable performance and available actuator capability and
their importance for the reliability of the system should be carefully considered in all
control designs [146].
System components can experience physical degradation during their operation, and the
severity of such degradation is related to the total operating life of the component. In this
context, it may be interesting to design controllers that can exploit the available knowl-
edge of the degradation dynamics to maintain adequate performance and extend the
useful life of the components.
Some assumptions are usually taken into account in order to model the degradation of
a component. For instance, in [56, 74, 75, 143–146] it is assumed that the degradation
is proportional to the control effort of actuators and it modifies the failure rate of each
actuator. More accurate assumptions can also be taken, for instance in [139, 141] the
degradation is assumed to be dependent not only on the load but also on the time and
environmental conditions. Constraints could be imposed to ensure that the cumulative
degradation will be acceptable at the end of the maintenance horizon [124].
Higher levels of availability and reliability are important objectives for the design of most
modern engineering systems and recently, a growing interest to model the reliability of
complex industrial systems by means of Bayesian Networks (BN) has appeared [174] and
some works on BN and system safety have been developed [178, 180, 181].
This can be performed by redistributing the control effort among the available compo-
nents or actuators to alleviate the work load and the stress factors on the equipment with
worst conditions to avoid their break down. For this purpose, an appropriate policy
should be developed to redistribute this effort until maintenance actions can be taken.
Such policy could be defined in terms of remaining useful life, reliability, degradation,
structure importance, aging, among others [10, 74].
The application of BNs to reliability started at the end of 90’s. In [163] the authors present
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the advantages of BNs in comparison with Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD). In [15] the
authors propose to model a fault tree using a BN.
Reliability is the ability of a system to operate successfully long enough to complete its
assigned mission under stated conditions. It can be modeled as an exponential function
[43, 182], a Weibull function [9, 67] or a Gamma function [84, 95, 112], among others.
Reliability can also be expressed as a stochastic process [117]. For example, it is common
to use Markov Chains (MC) to model the reliability of components [118]. Unfortunately,
in practice the complexity of the system leads to a combinatorial explosion of states re-
sulting in a MC with a very large size. The reliability information obtained with the MC
is propagated to the system using a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) which includes
temporal information to calculate the impact of the component reliability on the system
reliability [10].
The research in this field was mainly focused on improving the maintenance method-
ologies. However, the growing importance of maintenance has generated an increasing
interest in the development and implementation of optimal maintenance strategies for
improving system reliability, preventing the occurrence of system failures, and reducing
maintenance costs of deteriorated systems [171].
The maintenance has been done traditionally based on one of two conceptions; preven-
tive maintenance or corrective maintenance. Preventative maintenance performs regu-
larly scheduled maintenance actions to maintain system in good conditions and avoid
failures during service. Corrective maintenance leaves the system in operation until it
fails and then takes restorative maintenance actions. In contrast, both of them have draw-
backs. On one hand, preventive maintenance is expensive and the life cycle of system and
components is not maximized. On the other hand, the corrective maintenance maximizes
the life cycle of components but it has risks of damage to other components when failures
occur. Whichever of the approach that is taken, unanticipated failures result in downtime
of the system, and therefore there will always be a reactive maintenance needed.
As a result, the system downtime will be as long as the necessary spare parts and per-
sonnel be available and the time necessary to carry out the maintenance task. Condition-
Based Maintenance (CBM) has appeared as a new maintenance methodology which in-
volves the real-time analysis of system condition or system health state and based on this
information the maintenance tasks are performed.
By contrast to preventive and corrective maintenance approaches, CBM has the potential
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for minimizing system failures incidents, reducing scheduled maintenance tasks, maxi-
mization of the life cycle of components, and increment of system availability. The tech-
nical capabilities to infer system and components condition in real-time from measure-
ments of the process are critical to the success of a CBM implementation.
The use of new technologies in the production systems allows to improve products qual-
ity, reduce costs and increase productivity. However, new technologies usually involve
a high level of complexity and this complexity may result in more failure-prone systems.
Fault-tolerant control (FTC) has emerged as a response to this problem [23]. Therefore, it
is also possible to implement fault tolerant control (FTC) techniques whose objective is to
allow system functioning in spite of having faulty components such as actuators or sen-
sors [190]. Nevertheless, it would be interesting not to wait until a failure occurs but to
anticipate and prevent them from happening, especially to avoid incipient faults which
are difficult to detect. The detection of incipient faults is an open field of research due to
the fact that some detection methods such as observers or parity equations tend to track
the system even when there is a fault [39]. To achieve such an objective a Prognostics and
Health Management (PHM) strategy is commonly used.
The problematic of fault tolerant in systems has been widely treated by several authors.
Now days it is possible to talk about Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) as a field of
research addressed to the problem of detection and localization of faults. In FTC and FDI
research, works such as [13, 23, 44, 60–62] are obligatory reference due to the progress
they have made.
In recent years, HAC has been emerging as a new technique to handle this problem. It
consists in taking predictive actions to prevent a failure occurrence, instead of FTC that
takes actions after fault occurrence.
Hence, this problem can be addressed taking into account the system to improve the
system safety. HAC can extend the life time of the entire system or components and
avoid failures until the next maintenance task.
1.1.2 Prognostics and Health Management
Prognostics and Health-Management (PHM) involves the application of three concepts:
diagnostics, prognostics and health management. The first one identifies the state of
the system during its functioning, providing an accurate fault detection and isolation
capability with low false alarm rate [122].
PHM provides system health information based on the evaluation of its reliability and/or
its remaining useful life (RUL) which allows to make prediction of the advent of future
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failures or faults. In other words, PHM is a methodology which aims at the monitoring
of the system health which can be evaluated by the system reliability or the system RUL.
Moreover, PHM strategies also allow the reduction of the inspection and maintenance
efforts due to its continuous monitoring nature [40].
Figure 1.1 shows a generic architecture for PHM. It is based on three steps or stages, ob-
servation, analysis, and decision-making [36, 122]. The observation step consists in data
acquisition, processing, collection or storage. The analysis step processes the acquired
data and extracts of them the diagnostics, and prognostics information. In this step, the
monitoring of the system is performed based on the data acquired in the previous step.
Next, the appropriate decisions about logistics actions, maintenance, mission or control
reconfiguration are taken based on the information provided by the previous data analy-
sis.
FIGURE 1.1: PHM architecture.
In the analysis step various methods and algorithms are used in order to estimate the
remaining useful life of the asset. This process constitutes the diagnosis and prognostics.
In literature, there is a certain consensus about the classification of these methodologies,
for instance, in [4] they are classified into four categories, such as physical based, data-
driven, hybrid and experimental based.
The next step is the decision-making, where the proper actions are taken based on the
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state of the asset or system. Among the decision that could be taken are the mission
reconfiguration, perform or schedule a CBM or reconfigure the control inputs. To recon-
figure the system control inputs, a Health-Aware Control (HAC) methodologies should
be implemented. An HAC is a control methodology that based on the diagnosis and
prognostics information is able to reconfigure the control efforts in order to extend the
life cycle of the system and maintain a minimum level of control performance.
The concept and framework of PHM have been developed based mainly on maintenance
methodologies [40]. Basically, PHM tries to give a solution to two problems. On one
hand, it determines the time period to perform the maintenance tasks which produces
the less impact to the system operation integrity. And, on the other hand, it estimates
the RUL of the system and based on this information the decision-making module takes
the appropriate action, which could be, for example, to continue operating or perform an
immediate shut-down for maintenance.
The first gives an estimation if it is possible to reduce the maintenance needed by opti-
mizing the maintenance intervals, and at the same time, it aims at avoiding unplanned
maintenance shut-downs and their associated costs as well as improving safety and re-
ducing environmental impacts.
The second one estimates how changes in operational variables such as speed, load,
stress, can be applied in the next maintenance operation as well as the information about
if the system has a high probability of safe operation for the intended mission.
This thesis will study how the information about system health can be used by the control
algorithm in order to extend the useful life of the system, leading to the proposed HAC
methodology (red rectangle in Figure 1.1). This technique uses proper online prognostics
information of the system to modify the control actions or to change the mission objective
in order to maintain a high level of system health. An HAC prevents the occurrence of
incipient faults control loop.
Health-Aware Control (HAC) uses the information proportioned by the observation or
analysis steps to perform the proper actions in order to main the system under control
and mitigate the decrease of system health. HAC is part of the PHM structure conforming
the Decision-making step and combines the control theory and prognostics. In this thesis,
the prognostics if based on the reliability assessment of the system.
The HAC objective is achieved by modifying the controller in such a way that the system
health is part of the control objectives. Therefore, the control actions will be computed
to fulfill the control objectives and also to mitigate the degradation of the system, which
extends its useful life compared to schemes without HAC methodologies and facilitates
the implementation of CBM strategies.
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To mitigate the system reliability degradation, minimize operational costs and prevent
failures occurrence, actuator health monitoring should be considered. In some cases the
control effort can be redistributed among the available actuators to alleviate the work
load and the stress factors on equipments with worst conditions avoiding in this manner
their breakdown.
1.2 Thesis Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to study and develop a methodology for the design of
a Health-Aware Control strategy that takes into account the system and actuators relia-
bilities degradation in order to extend its useful life cycle.
Therefore, this thesis aims at going further in the research of making dynamic systems
to safer and more reliable. The proposed HAC methodology should provide major bene-
fits such as reducing maintenance costs, avoiding incipient and catastrophic failures and
increasing equipment uptime.
This thesis proposes a methodology to perform the system health evaluation, computa-
tion, and characterization and develop a methodology which allows the integration of
those health techniques in the control algorithms design.
The specific objectives involved in this thesis can be summarized as following:
1. To study the degradation and the reliability models for dynamic systems:
In this case a study of state of the art in degradation and reliability models used for
dynamical systems is developed.
2. To investigate and study the relation between control actions and degradation of
system actuators:
The purpose here is to identify the relationship between the control action and the
degradation of the actuators system).
3. To develop and design a health-aware control strategy that takes into account the
health information of the system and its components:
Design a HAC scheme that achieves some given performance specifications taking
into account the degradation/reliability information of the system and/or actua-
tors.
4. To study the performance of designed the control strategy:
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The objective is to study the impact of including degradation and reliability of the
system in the controller algorithm in terms of tracking error, efficiency, among oth-
ers.
5. Applications of the proposed Health-Aware Control methodology on different dy-
namic systems:
For the purpose of testing and validating the proposed methods and algorithms,
different case studies have been used: unmanned aerial vehicle, water distribution
network systems and twin rotor system. It is expected then, to illustrate with these
applications the objectives outlined before.
1.3 Case studies
As stayed by objective 5, the purpose of these applications is to illustrate the contributions
of this thesis. They will be used to study different approaches for control, degradation
and reliability modeling and assessment, and to compare results. In the following, the
systems are outlined and the expected results are stated.
The proposed HAC strategy will be implemented in a Drinking Water Network (DWN)
system, an octorotor system and a Twin Rotor MIMO system. The proposed approach
will integrate information about actuators health into the control design contributing to a
controller which achieves the control objective with a high overall system reliability. The
objective is to deal, from an availability point of view, with a closed-loop system combin-
ing a deterministic part related to the system dynamics and a stochastic part related to the
actuator and system reliability. The main contribution of this application is the integra-
tion of the reliability assessment computed online using a DBN in the Model Predictive
Control (MPC) algorithm. The resulting scheme will provide control performance while
preserving system reliability.
These applications are justified by the fact that having a system in a good condition is a
must to avoid failure impacts or economic waste. For instance in the multirotor field, a
system which is able to operate in a safe way, i.e. avoiding unanticipated failures, can
prevent injuries and damage to operators and people in its surrounding and also to the
environment. Regarding a DWN, it is critical to have a healthy system an interruption of
its operation can leads to economic losses and consumer complaints.
Therefore, there are two important objectives, one is related to the reduction of economic
costs and the other is the safety of the system for the people, the environment and the
system itself.
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In the UAV application, the aim is to modify the control inputs or change the mission
objective, using system reliability information that will be provided by a proper on-line
prognostic tool. It is expected to have an increment of the operation time of the system
[136, 144].
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are well-suited to a wide range of mission scenarios,
such as search, rescue, vigilance, and inspection, among others. However, the overall
mission performance can be strongly influenced by vehicle sensors and actuators failures
or degradations. Moreover, for this kind of systems, it could be more appropriate to
avoid the fault occurrence than tolerate them.
The emergence of complex and autonomous systems, such as automated industrial pro-
cesses, modern aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, among others, is driving the develop-
ment and implementation of new control technologies that are aimed to accommodate in-
cipient failures and maintain a stable system operation for the duration of the emergency.
The primary motivation for this application has emerged over the need for improved
reliability and performance for safety critical systems, particularly in aerospace-related
applications.
An over-actuated system can be defined as a system which has more control inputs than
regulated outputs. These systems are interesting in many control applications, especially
where multiple actuators performing the same action are desirable for safety reasons,
fault-tolerant policies or energy consumption optimization. Moreover, the presence of
multiple inputs introduces a certain degree of redundancy, meaning that there exist an
entire family of input functions and possibly of state trajectories that are compatible with
a prescribed reference for the output [28, 186]. By contrast, an under-actuated system is
defined as a system whose number of control inputs is lower than the number of con-
trolled outputs [42, p. 18].
In particular, multirotors UAVs are under-actuated systems, but they present redundancy
in the actuators and have the potential to improve safety and reliability. Several control
techniques have been applied to multirotors, such as Model Predictive Control (MPC) [2,
94, 129], PID [131] and LQR [3, 100]. Some control techniques have been used to design
HAC strategies, i.e. with MPC [143] or control allocation [72].
Another application including actuator degradation information to illustrate the pro-
posed HAC approach has been performed on a Twin Rotor MIMO system. The approach
consists in considering not only the degradation constraints but also the control input
weighting factors, in the MPC cost function, as a tool to design a reliable control.
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1.4 Thesis outline
The thesis is organized into two parts:
Part I presents a review of the fundamental concepts on which this thesis is based, re-
sulting in a literature review of degradation modeling, reliability modeling and control
techniques. It is made up of four chapters:
• Chapter 2 presents a literature review on PHM and HAC approaches.
• Chapter 3 is dedicated to degradation and reliability modeling approaches that ex-
ists in the literature.
• Chapter 4 presents the reliability assessment methods including: Markov chains,
the structure function, Bayesian and, dynamic Bayesian networks. The component
and system reliability modeling is illustrated through a DWN example.
• Chapter 5 recalls the background theory about Model Predictive Control and Lin-
ear-Quadratic Regulator.
Part II presents the results that constitute a contribution to the state of the art on Health
Aware Control (HAC). It is made up of two chapters:
• Chapter 6 presents the integration of the system health information into the HAC
approach proposed in this thesis.
• Chapter 7 presents a study about two reliability interpretation approaches: the in-
stantaneous reliability and the expected reliability.
Finally, the thesis is concluded by:
• Chapter 8 which summarizes the main conclusions and briefly suggests some pos-
sible lines for future research arising from this work.
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1.5.1 Research stays
During the development of this thesis, two research stays were made in the Centre de
Recherche en Automatique de Nancy at the Université de Lorraine with a duration of 4
months each one. The first one, from May to July 2014 where the work was concerned to
the topic of reliable control of complex systems, the study of the mathematical modeling
of the degradation/reliability using Bayesian approaches, and the investigation of the
integration of this modeling in the control algorithm.
And the second one, from May to July 2015 where the work was concerned with the topic
of reliable control of complex systems, the study of reliability importance measures, the
study of the integration of degradation/reliability model in the control algorithm, and
also some ideas on the integration of reliability with linear matrix inequalities to compute





Prognostics and Health Management
This chapter presents the concept of Prognostics and Health Management
and offers a review of PHM methodologies based on the control techniques
used to implement an HAC approach.
2.1 Introduction
In industrial processes or dynamical systems health status of its components such as
actuators or sensors is of primary concern as its failure will lead to immediate system
shutdown or loss of performance in terms of economical cost or productivity. A well-
managed system that minimizes the risk of failure is therefore desirable in many appli-
cations. The capability to accurately predict the health of system components (and con-
sequently the system health itself) is the key to ensuring their dependability, availability,
reliability, safety, and security.
A system is said to be dependable when it is trustworthy enough to have confidence on
the service that it gives. For a system to be dependable, it must be available and ready for
use when is needed; reliable, when it is able to provide continuity of service while it is
in use; safe, when it does not have a catastrophic consequence on the environment; and
secure, when it is able to preserve confidentiality [147].
Thus, the concern about preserving the health of complex system has led to the develop-
ment of different techniques such as Fault-Tolerant Control (FTC) and Prognostics and
Health Management (PHM).
Briefly, those control techniques which have the capacity to maintain the overall system
stability and a satisfactory performance in presence of faults are called FTC. This means
that a closed-loop system is fault tolerant if it is able to tolerate component malfunctions
while maintaining a desirable performance and stability properties.
FTC techniques can be classified into three groups:
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• Hardware redundancies techniques:
The hardware redundancy techniques try to achieve fault tolerance by taking ad-
vantage of the hardware redundancy in the system. Their main advantage is its
simplicity but it implies a cost of redundant hardware and maintenance.
• Analytical redundancy techniques: Passive Fault Tolerant Control (PFTC):
The passive FTC techniques are control laws that take into account the fault appear-
ance as a system perturbation. Therefore, within defined margins, the control law
has built-in fault-tolerant capabilities, allowing the system to face fault occurrence,
thanks to its robustness against a class of faults.
The advantage of this approach is that it needs neither fault diagnosis nor controller
reconfiguration, but as it needs to take in consideration all possible faults of a sys-
tem during the design stage it provides limited fault tolerance capabilities, thus it
cannot be guaranteed that unconsidered faults can be handled. Moreover, it entails
a loss of performance with respect to the nominal case.
• Analytical redundancy techniques: Active Fault Tolerant Control (AFTC):
The active FTC techniques readjust the control law based on the information pro-
vided by the faults diagnosis module. With this information, some automatic ad-
justments in the control law are done after the fault occurrence attempting to meet
the control objectives with the minimum performance degradation.
Discussions on FTC are beyond the scope of this thesis and interested readers are referred
to [13, 190] and the references therein which review the developments made in this area.
PHM is a methodology aimed at handling the “System Health” understood as system
reliability, remaining useful life (RUL), system degradation, etc, and based on a real-time
monitoring and incipient fault detection.
The main difference between both methodologies is that while FTC is applied when the
fault has occurred, PMH is applied during the whole system functioning and its aim is to
avoid or at least to delay the fault occurrence.
In other words, FTC techniques do not provide an active reconfiguration of the control
law given the health component state. In so far, as the application of PHM and the devel-
opment of on-line prognostics techniques have evolved, a new type of FTC called Proac-
tive FTC, which has two primary objectives: damage avoidance while ensuring primary
mission success [160].
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Proactive Fault-Tolerant Control is also called Health-Aware Control (HAC), and its func-
tioning is as follows: given proper on-line prognostic information of the system, the HAC
modifies the controller actions or reschedules the mission profile in order to preserve a
high level of system health.
HAC technique evaluates the health system while performing control over the system
in a non-faulty situation. Moreover, it avoids faulty scenarios by mitigating the health
degradation via appropriate control actions considering health indicators in the control
objectives. This is done by constantly evaluating the system health indicators and making
corrections through the control actions based on those indicators.
A review on methodologies which combine the use of reliability and control theories,
their origins, and their applications, based on a bibliography search related to the topics
involved in HAC will be presented.
Remark in Figure 2.1 the persistent increase in the works related to the topics of reliability
and control, including fault-tolerant and health-aware techniques from 2000 to 2016.
FIGURE 2.1: Amount of Publications Evolution.
Therefore, it is clear that the interest on this field has been increasing. Those works are
classified in the following fields: Engineering, Computer Sciences and Mathematics, Ma-
terial Sciences, Chemical Engineering and Multidisciplinary as it is shown in Figure 2.2.
Furthermore, it is worth to highlight the work that some research communities are doing
in this field encouraging the development of new work and promoting different confer-
ences and journals. To mention just a few, there is the Prognostics and Health Manage-
ment Society, which supports a conference each year and maintains a journal. Also, the
IEEE Reliability Society, which supports a conference and a journal on these topics.
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FIGURE 2.2: Related works by fields.
In addition, these topics are being addressed in reputed conferences, such as the Mediter-
ranean Control Conference (MED), the IFAC Symposium on Fault Detection, Supervision
and Safety on Technical Process (SAFEPROCESS), the International Conference on Con-
trol and Fault-Tolerant Systems (Systol), the International Science Conference Diagnostics
of Processes and Systems (DPS), the International Conference on Control, Decision and
Information technologies (CoDIT), and the World Congress of the International Federa-
tion of Automatic Control among others.
2.2 Prognostics and Health Management
The prognostics information is useful because it supplies the decision maker with ade-
quate information about the expected time to system or components failure and allows to
take the suitable actions to deal with them. Assessing the health of a system provides in-
formation that can be used to meet several critical goals: (1) providing advance warning
of failures; (2) minimizing unscheduled maintenance, extending maintenance cycles, and
maintaining effectiveness through timely repair actions; (3) reducing the life-cycle cost of
equipment by decreasing inspection costs, downtime, and inventory; and (4) improving
qualification and assisting in the design and logistical support of fielded and future sys-
tems [121]. In this sense, PHM is an emerging engineering discipline that links studies of
system failure to system life cycle management [36].
The main aim of PHM is to improve safety and reduce maintenance cost. To achieve this
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objective some tasks, such as system monitoring, failure prognostics, and RUL compu-
tation, can be involved. Based on that, some actions like logistics requirements, mainte-
nance performance, components replacement or controller reconfiguration, among oth-
ers, should be taken in order to manage the health of the system.
The steps involved in a PHM strategy are observation, analysis, and decision making
(see Figure 2.3). Observation is the step where the data is acquired and processed. The
second step consists in analyzing the data and extracting information of it, such as health
state, RUL, to perform diagnosis and prognostics. And, the third step consists in taking


















FIGURE 2.3: Steps involved in a PHM strategy.
PHM concept has its origins in system engineering and considers aspects such as quality,
reliability, and maintenance which are used to provide indications of anomalies and make
predictions of future failures [40].
Research on PHM methodologies motivated by the benefits it brings has been increased
considerably in the last decade. For instance, a literature review on prognostics can be
found in [122], and a particular review of data-driven methods for PHM can be found
in [165], a PHM review in manufacturing process can be found in [170]. A review on
machinery PHM implementing Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) which summarizes
the recent research with emphasis on models, algorithms and technologies for data pro-
cessing and maintenance decision-making is presented in [64].
In [48] a diagnosis and prognostic approach for power electronic drives and electric ma-
chines (AC/DC, DC/DC and DC/AC systems) is presented. This approach incorporates
a low cost monitoring of the power electronics such as power MOSFETs and IGBTs. The
proposed HAC strategy consists in reducing the performance of the control accomplish-
ing the mission with reduced performance.
Prognostics strategies can be implemented using different techniques. A classification
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of them can be found in [4, 36]. The one given in [4] is presented in Figure 2.4, which
considers four categories: physical-based, data-driven, hybrid and experimental-based
techniques. These categories are explained in detail below primarily based in [4, 36, 64].
FIGURE 2.4: Prognostics approaches
Physical-based methodologies
In the physical-based approach, the first principles are used to obtain accurate theoretical
models specific for a particular type of component. In this category, there are the fol-
lowing approaches: physical model, cumulative damage, hazard rate and proportional
hazard rate, nonlinear dynamics.
The physical models are used to describe the physics of the system and failure modes,
such as crack propagation, wear corrosion among others. These models combine system-
specific mechanical knowledge, defect growth equations, and condition monitoring to
provide better prognostics output. These methodologies are more accurate than data-
driven ones due that they contain a functional mapping of the system parameters.
Using an explicit model of the system and residual generation methods such as Kalman
filter, parameter estimation (or system identification) and parity relations, it is possible to
obtain signals, called residuals, which are indicative of fault presence in the system. The
residuals are used to implement fault detection, isolation and identification techniques.
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Model-based approaches can be more effective than other model-free approaches. How-
ever, a correct and accurate model is needed, and an explicit mathematical model may
not be feasible for complex systems [64].
There are some applications of physical models, for instance in [90], the authors used
the Paris’ law to model spur gear crack growth from an analysis of the stress and strain
fields based on gear tooth load, geometry and material properties. In [116], the authors
presented RUL computation approach based on a crack growth model and implemented
using observers and intensity stress measures. In [87], RUL estimation approach for gears
based on fatigue teeth crack, gear dynamics, and fracture models was proposed.
Physics-based prognostics have been applied to systems in which their degradation phe-
nomenon can be mathematically modeled such as in a gearbox prognostic module [17].
Physical modeling and parametric identification techniques have been applied with fault
detection an failure prediction algorithms in order to predict the system time-to-failure.
The faults and failure modes are traced back to physically meaningful system parame-
ters, providing valuable diagnostic and prognostic information.
In [102], a residual-based failure prognostic technique applied to a hydraulic system was
proposed. The remaining system useful life is estimated based on residual signals, a
bond graph model of the system dynamics, and the degradation model, which allows
the prediction of the future health state of the system.
Physical-based prognostics approaches are very effective and descriptive because system
degradation modeling is based on laws of nature. Remark that the accuracy and precision
depend on model fidelity [166]. There are some disadvantages and limitations of this
approach such as: developing a high fidelity model for RUL estimation is very costly,
time-consuming, and computationally costly and sometimes it cannot be obtained. Also,
it will be component/system specific which limits its use to other similar cases. Hence,
sometimes the data-driven approach is preferably used [36].
Data-driven methodologies
Data-driven methods are based on the fact that condition monitoring data and the ex-
tracted features vary with the development of either the initiation and propagation pro-
cess or the degradation process. These methods are useful when a large quantity of noisy
data needs to be transformed into a logical information to estimate the RUL whose accu-
racy depends on the quantity and quality of the data.
The data-driven prognostics methodology is based on statistical and learning techniques,
most of which come from the theory of pattern recognition. Such approaches incorporate
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conventional numerical algorithms, like linear regression or Kalman filters, as well as al-
gorithms commonly found in the machine learning and data mining communities. The
recent algorithms include Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), decision trees, and Sup-
port Vector Machines (SVMs).
An ANN is a computational model that mimics the human neural system structure. It
consists of simple processing elements connected in a complex arrangement which al-
lows the model to approximate a non-linear function with multiple inputs and multiple
outputs. A processing element involves a node and a weight. By a training process, the
ANN learns the function by adjusting its weights with observations of inputs and out-
puts [64]. There are different neural network types. The Feedforward Neural Network
(FFNN) is one of the most popularly applied in machine fault diagnosis. For instance,
in [134] the authors proposed a condition-based health monitoring approach for rotating
machinery using ANNs, where the neural network is trained to contain the knowledge of
a detailed finite-element model whose results are integrated with system measurements
to produce accurate machine fault diagnostics and component stress predictions.
The use of ANN for prognostics has two types of applications, one is a nonlinear function
approximation to predict system failure features and biases by estimating and classifying,
the other involves feedback connections to model dynamic processes of system degrada-
tion for RUL assessment [29].
In [188], the use of a Self-Organizing Map (SOM) neural network for multivariable trend-
ing of fault development to estimate the RUL of a bearing system was proposed. In [149]
a diagnosis approach based on Bayesian networks incorporating failure probability in-
formation, instrument uncertainty, and the predictions of false indication. They extend
such ideas to perform prognostics and model the evolution over time using a DBN.
Hidden Markov model (HMM) is also an appropriate model for the joint analysis of event
and condition monitoring data. An HMM consists of two stochastic processes: a Markov
chain with finite number of states describing an underlying mechanism and an observa-
tion process depending on the hidden state. Particularly, the approaches of this category
do not require assumptions or empirical estimations of physical parameters. They are
adequate to process noisy data, such as that provided by measurements of input/output.
Nevertheless, they require a large amount of data to be accurate [64].
Hybrid methodologies
In some cases, the use of a determined prognostics approach is not enough to characterize
the system parameters which makes it difficult to predict with a single method. Hence,
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the application of several methodologies used in conjunction produces more accurate
results [6]. Such approach takes data from all the sensors required by various method-
ologies, performs stipulated steps and gives optimum RUL estimate through the fusion
of all estimates.
The statistical model-based approach requires the formulation of a model using parame-
ters of the considered system. The RUL is obtained by using data gathered over a period
of time as an input to the model.
In [76], RUL estimation methodology for aircraft components based on usage monitor-
ing data was proposed. The authors used Monte Carlo simulations based on a desired
component reliability to prognosticate the component loads and fatigue lifetime values.
Fourier transform can also be used to extract useful data from monitored signals. That
extracted data can be used as input in an ANN and compute the RUL estimation. For
example, in [83], the authors proposed to monitor the vibration signals of a rotating bear-
ing and perform a spectral analysis using Fourier transform to separate useful time-fre-
quency features. They proposed a 2-layer neural network: one for diagnosis with three
situations (normal condition, unbalance failure and other failures) and another to esti-
mate the RUL of the bearing.
Cheng and Pecht [25] presented a case study for RUL estimation using fusion approach
for ceramic capacitors. This method fuses data-driven methods and physics of failure
methods to predict the remaining useful life of electronic products. This fusion provides
the advantage and overcome the limitations of the data-driven methods and the physics
of failure methods to provide better predictions. A fusion approach is also proposed in
Goebel, Eklund, et al. [50], where a model from first principles of the physics of fault
initiation and propagation, and data from controlled condition experiments are used to
develop an empirical model of condition-based fault propagation rate for aircraft engine
bearings.
Experimental-based methodologies
In the experience-based approach, probabilistic or stochastic models of the degradation
process or the life cycle of components is used by taking into account the data and the
knowledge acquired in the practice or collected in experiments [70].
The experiments can be performed in several manners; they can be by using one param-
eter or multivariate methods. The selection of the most method depends on the problem
and the number of parameters to be considered. In the experiments, the time to failure
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has been considered as function of of load, frequency of load and other relevant parame-
ters. With methods such as finite element method (FEM), the possibilities of performing
theoretically stresses calculation have dramatically increased. As experiments are often
costly, an effort has been made to develop these types of methods [4].
In [157] a study of three prognostic approaches was presented. The comparison of these
approaches is based on experimental data from 17 ball bearing. The estimation of the
remaining useful life of the test bearing is performed by algorithms trained with experi-
mental data.
The research in experimental approaches is leading to the development of new measure-
ment equipment to collect the experimental parameters and then formulate theoretical
models based on data [4].
The application fields based on this approach include: energy engineering, experimental
mechanics, engineering materials, fluid mechanics, steel structures, chemical processing,
among others. The experimental test rigs are typically designed in research laboratories
to simulate real operating conditions for the component or system in question usually to
verify theoretical models.
This approach is used to validate other methods. For instance, in [21] the authors val-
idated the performance of an adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference systems predictor using
experimental data obtained from the planetary gear carrier plate of a UH-60 helicopter.
In [101], it is proposed to use experimental data from the accelerated life of bearings to
verify a method based on data driven and model based approaches.
2.3 Reliability and Control: historical review
In the literature, some authors have used the term of “reliable control” to indistinctly
name to a health-aware control, control with redundancy, FTC, etc. As an attempt to
disambiguate the meaning of reliable control and health-aware control concepts, a review
of the uses given to those concepts in the literature is presented.
The beginning of reliable control concept can be found in [152], where the author pro-
posed the use of redundant controllers to enhance the reliability of the control system
based upon a decentralized control scheme. In this case, the reliability concept is asso-
ciated with the control structure composed by 2 or more independent controllers. Such
structure guarantees stability under controller failures and perturbations in the plant in-
terconnection structure. The concept reliable comes from the fact of having redundancy
improves the control system availability in case of failure of one control module.
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Next, in [169], the authors used the term reliable to define a pair of controllers which are
able to stabilize and regulate the system, either working together or separately in case of
a failure of one of them. They referred to this approach as reliable stabilization problem and
reliable regulation, respectively. Again, the concept of reliability is linked with the ability
of the controller to continue functioning in the presence of failures on itself.
Later in [11], the authors proposed a methodology to fusion system theory and reliability.
It involved including the structural reliability of system components (computed by a
Markov model) into a gain scheduling control law. Such methodology was referred to as
a reliable control system design. In this work, the reliability of the components is taken into
account to influence the control system design. The resulting control law depends on the
system structure, the structural dynamics, and the system dynamics. The solution to the
optimal control problem defines the boundary between reliable (stabilizable) designs and
unreliable designs. Note that the authors use the concept of reliability to denote a system
which stability can be ensured.
In [26], the authors propose a reliable control system to enhance the reliability of the con-
troller using a multiple parallel controller structure composed of a main feedback con-
troller in addition to a redundant adaptive controller whose outputs summation guar-
antees zero tracking error between the set-point input and the plant output in the case
of failure of the main controller and/or changes in plant parameters. This approach ba-
sically incorporates fault tolerance and robust control characteristics to the system by
adding a redundant controllers.
In [167] the authors presented a methodology for the design of reliable centralized and
decentralized control systems. The authors meant by reliable in this case that the pro-
posed methodology guarantees stability and H∞ performance not only when all control
components are operative, but also under sensor or actuator outages in the centralized
case, or control channel outages in the decentralized case. In other words, they use the
concept of reliable control to designed the effects of a FTC methodology.
In [74] and [72], the authors propose a methodology of fault-tolerant control design incor-
porating actuator health (actuator reliability) for stability and tracking control problem
was proposed. The fault-tolerant controller which the control objective with a high over-
all system reliability improving the dependability of the system by keeping the set of
actuators available as long as possible. The proposed approach attempts to diminish the
use of those actuators with the highest impact on the system reliability. Such impact is
computed based on a reliability analysis of the system structure assumed to be a parallel
one.
An attempt to delineate the relationship between reliability and FTC can be found in [180,
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181], where the authors propose a reliability analysis of fault-tolerant control systems
using Markov models and present some of the software tools for assessing the reliability.
They define the concept of coverage as a parameter that reflects the ability of a system
to automatically recover from the occurrence of a fault and claim that enhancing the
coverage is the key to enhanced the system reliability.
As it has been presented, the concepts of reliable control and FTC have many aspects in
common. Both are intended to enhance the reliability, safety, and ensure system opera-
tion, among others. For instance, reliable control aims at enhancing the control system by
improving its reliability, i.e., by having a redundant control architecture as a backup strat-
egy in the case of control module failure. Furthermore, FTC aims at enhancing the system
reliability by reconfiguring the control action in order to compensate system components
faults, such as sensor, actuators or deviation of parameters.
On the other hand, Health-Aware Control (HAC) is a concept that combines the health
monitoring and prognostics with the control theory. This means that techniques to per-
form condition monitoring, prognostics and control are integrated in order to develop
an HAC scheme. Figure 2.5 represents the different techniques involved in HAC scheme
found in the literature.
FIGURE 2.5: Control theory and health monitoring merge.
The main difference between FTC and HAC is that, on the one hand, FTC is concerned
with the control of a system where a component is in a faulty state. This situation implies
that the controller is able to adapt the system behavior once the fault is detected, isolated
and estimated. On the other hand, the HAC uses the information provided by the prog-
nostics and health monitoring module about the component or system health to modify
the controller in order to fulfill the control objectives and also extend the availability and
useful life of the system.
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In other words, an HAC strategy adjusts the controller when the system is in a nonfaulty
situation and redistribute the control efforts based on the prognostics module, which esti-
mates the component and system aging under the specific operating condition. Whereas,
the FTC adjust or modifies the control input one the fault has occurred.
2.4 HAC classification
Although HAC is currently an incipient field of research, there are some contributions
that combine control and reliability theories, as it has been presented along this chapter,
and most of them are known as reliable control.
However, since at that time prognostics was not a developed field, the HAC approach
was not sufficiently developed, and a lot of emphasis was put on diagnosing the fault
and developing control reconfiguration and accommodation techniques which led to the
development of FTC techniques.
Table 2.1 presents a list of the control approaches used in combination with reliability
methods to develop FTC schemes in addition to system monitoring. For instance, in [124]
the authors propose to model the degradation process in terms of asset usage and then
use it to redistribute the control effort in a two-tank system by means of an MPC algo-
rithm which solves a quadratic optimization problem and a linear optimization problem
[125].
TABLE 2.1: Existing Control design methodologies in HAC
Control designing approaches References
MPC Grosso, Ocampo, et al. [54], Pereira, Galvao, et
al. [124, 125], Robles, Puig, et al. [133], Salazar,
Nejjari, et al. [136, 137], and Salazar, Weber, et al.
[143, 144]
LMI, robust control, H∞, LQR Chamseddine, Theilliol, et al. [20], Dardinier-
Maron, Hamelin, et al. [31], Gokdere, Chiu, et al.
[51], Guenab, Theilliol, et al. [56], Guenab, We-
ber, et al. [58], Khelassi, Jiang, et al. [72], Khela-
ssi, Theilliol, et al. [73–75], Langeron, Grall, et al.
[82], Oca and Puig [113], Tang, Kacprzynski, et
al. [159], Weber, Boussaid, et al. [175], and We-
ber, Simon, et al. [178]
PID Escobet, Puig, et al. [38], Nguyen, Dieulle, et al.
[109–111], Tang, Kacprzynski, et al. [160], and
Wang, Tomovic, et al. [173]
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Robust control approaches are used for instance in [58], where the objective is to maintain
stability and performance of the system near to the desired performance in the presence
of system component faults, and in certain circumstances reduce the performance re-
quirements to achieve the objective. In [75] and [74], the authors propose the integration
of reliability and reconfigurability analysis in an FTC system for a tank system and air-
craft model, respectively. These works have in common the use of components reliability
as indexes to perform the control reconfiguration after the occurrence of failures.
In [73], the authors propose an FTC system based on a feedback controller which guar-
antees the highest system reliability. This controller is synthesized using linear matrix
inequalities (LMIs) and incorporating a reliability indicator, this reliability indicator is
the well known Birnbaum measure which indicates those system components whose re-
liability are critical for the reliability of the system. Note that in the mentioned works, the
asset reliabilities are modeled using the exponential distribution function.
In [72], the authors propose a reconfigurable control allocation problem applied to an
over-actuated system in which the redistribution factor is defined in terms of the actu-
ator reliabilities modeled by using the Weibull distribution function. Then, the control
allocation problem consists in assigning more control effort to those actuators whose re-
liabilities are higher and to relieve those actuators whose reliabilities are lower.
In [10] and [9], a control allocation problem is solved by incorporating reliability im-
portance measures to redistribute the control effort among the available actuators of a
hydraulic system. The reliability is modeled using a Weibull distribution function and it
is computed by a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN).
Table 2.2 present a list of application made in this topic. For instance, in [124] a PHM
scheme using MPC is presented. An application using a tank level over-actuated system
is presented. The main idea is to manage the actuators degradation over the maintenance
horizon to achieve the control goals using MPC.
In [113] an approach to design a reliable admissible model matching (AMM) fault tolerant
control (FTC) for LPV systems is proposed. The main idea is to reconfigure the controller
on-line taking into account changes due to the faults, maintaining a certain actuators
reliability level in spite of the faults.
In [91] the authors present a reliable robust tracking controller against actuator faults
and control surface impairment for aircraft bases in on a mixed linear-quadratic (LQ)/
H∞ performance indexes and multiobjective optimization using linear matrix inequali-
ties (LMIs). In such work, the concept reliable is used to mean trustworthy due to the fact
that authors proposed a control approach with fault tolerance capabilities under actua-
tors outages.
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TABLE 2.2: Application examples of HAC
Applications References
Aircraft Chamseddine, Theilliol, et al. [20], Khelassi, Jiang,
et al. [72], Khelassi, Theilliol, et al. [73, 74], LI,
Zhao, et al. [88], Oca and Puig [113], Salazar, Ne-
jjari, et al. [137], Theilliol, Weber, et al. [162], and
Weber, Boussaid, et al. [175]
Tank level systems Abdel-Geliel, Badreddin, et al. [1], Bicking, We-
ber, et al. [9], Dardinier-Maron, Hamelin, et al.
[31], Grosso, Ocampo, et al. [54], Guenab, Weber,
et al. [58], Khelassi, Theilliol, et al. [75], Nguyen,
Dieulle, et al. [109–111], Pereira, Galvao, et al. [124,
125], Robles, Puig, et al. [133], Salazar, Nejjari, et
al. [136, 137], Salazar, Weber, et al. [143, 144], and
Weber, Simon, et al. [178]
Electromechanics systems Escobet, Puig, et al. [38], Ginart, Barlas, et al. [48],
Gokdere, Chiu, et al. [51], Lee, Kim, et al. [85], and
Tang, Kacprzynski, et al. [159]
In [75] the authors propose the integration of reliability evaluation in a fault-tolerant con-
trol system and illustrate with a flight control application. The controller is analyzed with
respect to reliability requirements and its controllability defined through its Gramian.
The admissible solution is proposed according to reliability evaluation based on energy
consumption under degraded functional conditions.
In [132] the authors present an overview of modeling and control strategies including
fault-tolerant capabilities for wind turbines and wave energy devices. In these systems,
the reliability improvement is achieved by a significant reduction of periods of null or
very low power production.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, a literature review on Prognostics and Health Management, particularly
in the historical development of Health-Aware Control methodologies has been pre-
sented. Besides the attempts to address the problem of HAC, a list of applications and
control techniques used were given.
Approaches to include the system health information in the controller design has been
proposed, but it is still an open research field to explore. The problem of how to include
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the health information in a systematic way in the controller design should be further
investigated.
The interaction between prognostics and control establishes a new feedback loop. To un-
derstand the effects of this loop in the whole performance of the system, a mathematical
formulation of the problem should be considered. Due to the combined discrete-event/
continuous nature of the reconfiguration/accommodation actions and the control loop,
respectively, techniques coming from hybrid system theory could be applied.
The appropriate health indicator to be used for reconfiguring/accommodating the con-
troller is also a key issue. Some methodologies for the designer should be given in order
to facilitate the design of the HAC reconfiguration/accommodation strategy.
Furthermore, model-based prognostic approaches accuracy depends on the availability
of an accurate model and data. Data-driven methods are preferred in the case of quick
estimations with lower accuracy. Nevertheless, physics-based approaches seem to be the
most adequate when prognostics accuracy is needed and the data is limited.
Chapter 3
Background on reliability
In this chapter, a review of degradation and reliability concepts and their
modeling approaches is presented. The research in degradation and reliabil-
ity has been a topic of relevant interest since they provide an estimation of
span life for systems and components. Therefore, a review of the most rele-
vant of both, theoretical and applied contributions found in the literature is
given.
In Section 3.1, an introduction to reliability and degradation is given, and the
most used probability distributions are described. Then, in Section 3.2, an
explanation about covariates and how they can be modeled and integrated
into the probability distributions is presented (Section 3.2.1). After, in Sec-
tion 3.2.2, some models to fit degradation data, such as fitting data to proba-
bility distribution or using regressors, are presented.
3.1 Reliability and degradation
Reliability analysis of dynamical systems helps to prevent failures which could be costly
and sometimes disastrous. In complex systems or in safety-critical systems, it is imper-
ative to identify the key component of the system and prevent the system failure. Gen-
erally, this is done by implementing Conditioned-Based Maintenance (CBM) methods,
where decisions are supported by the reliability analysis information.
In the literature, authors refer indistinctly to the concepts of reliability, degradation, dete-
rioration, etc. In general terms, reliability leads to the concept of dependability, successful
operation or performance, and the absence of failures, whereas unreliability (lack of reli-
ability) leads to the opposite [14]. Thus, it is convenient now to give a clear definition of
these concepts.
Definition 3.1. Reliability is the probability that an asset will perform its functioning cor-
rectly for a specified period of time and under specified operating conditions [14].
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Chapter 3. Background on reliability 31
Whereas, degradation can be defined as:
Definition 3.2. Degradation is the the reduction in performance, reliability and lifespan of
assets [52].
Degradation can be viewed as a damage that the system accumulates over time and even-
tually leads to a failure when the accumulated damage reaches a failure threshold.
The condition of a component can be characterized according to the degree of detail given
to the degradation process [105]. It could be characterized as binary condition (see Fig-
ure 3.1(a)), being equal to 1 if the component is in its working state, i.e., the component
performance is satisfactory or acceptable, and 0 for the opposite situation, where the com-
ponent is in the faulty state. In this characterization, the component starts in the working
state and changes to the failed one after a period of time (failure time). This is repre-
sented as a random variable because the time instant of change from working to failed is
uncertain. An example of characterization is an electric bulb where its state changes from
working to failed in a very short time which can be assumed to be instantaneous.
(a) (b)
(c)
FIGURE 3.1: Component condition characterization: (a) binary states, (b)
multi-state with finite states, (c) multi-state with infinite states.
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Also, it could be characterized with a finite number of states (see Figure 3.1(b)) where the
condition of the component can assume any value from the set {1, 2, . . . ,K}with:
• 1 corresponding to component performance being fully acceptable, i.e., the compo-
nent is in the good working state.
• i, 1 < i < K corresponding to component performance being partially acceptable,
i.e., component is in a working state with a higher value of i implying a higher level
of degradation and,
• K corresponding to component performance being unacceptable, i.e, the compo-
nent is in a faulty state.
The time to failure of the component is given by tF = inf{t : Z(t) = K}. An example
of this characterization consider the wear in a tire, where no wear corresponds to state 1
and complete wear corresponds to state K.
And finally, it could be characterized with an infinite number of levels (see Figure 3.1(c))
being an extension of the above case with K = ∞. Here a higher value implies a higher
degradation, and the component failure time is given by tF = inf{t : Z(t) = Zth}.
Remark that, when the level of degradation reaches the threshold Zth the asset failure
occurrence increases. As a consequence, a failure is often a result of the effect of degra-
dation.
From these two definitions, remark that reliability declines when assets degrade or de-
teriorate. The failure threshold provides a link between degradation and assets failure,
therefore, it is possible to use the degradation signals to estimate the failure time distribu-
tion, the RUL, etc. The degradation signals are obtained by a proper degradation model,
which consists in developing a good probability model that is capable of describing the
degradation process.
More specifically, reliability is the probability that a system or component will operate
properly for a specific period of time under design operating conditions (such as temper-
ature, volts, etc.) without failure. In other words, reliability can be used as a measure of
the success of the system to provide its function adequately.
Mathematically, reliability R(t) is the probability that a system will be successful in the
interval from time 0 to time t:
R(t) = Pr(T > t) t ≥ 0, (3.1)
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where T is a random variable denoting the time-to-failure or failure time. Which is the
time until the system first enter the down (failure) state:
T = inf{t : system state = down}, (3.2)
And the unreliability F (t), which is a measure of failure, is defined as the probability that
a system will fail by time t:
F (t) = Pr(T ≤ t) ∀t ≥ 0, (3.3)
in other words, F (t) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf ), also called failure dis-
tribution function.
If the time-to-failure random variable T has a density function f(t), then the reliability








= f(t)1− F (t) ,
(3.5)
is called the failure or hazard rate [47, p. 25]. The term h(t)dt is the probability that a
device at the age of t will fail in the time interval t to (t + dt). The importance of the
hazard function lies in that it indicates the change in the failure rate over the life of a
population of components by plotting their hazard functions on a single axis.
In reliability theory, several types of probability distributions are used; for example, ex-
ponential, Weibull, gamma, lognormal, among others. A brief description of some of
these distribution functions will be given below.
The exponential distribution is one of the most widely used in reliability engineering
because it is relatively easy to handle in performing reliability analysis, and many en-
gineering items exhibit constant hazard rate during their useful life [32]. Its probability
density function (pdf ) is defined by
f(t) = λe−λt t ≥ 0, λ > 0, (3.6)
where λ is the distribution parameter which is also known as the constant failure rate.
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Reliability (3.7) refers to the probability that a device’s lifetime is larger than t, the prob-
ability that the device will survive beyond time t, or the probability that the device fail
after time t. Remark that R(0) = 1 and R(∞) = 0 and that reliability function is a non
increasing function of t.
From (3.5) and using (3.6) and (3.7) it is evident that, for the exponential distribution, the





The exponential distribution has the memoryless property, which means that the current
reliability status does not depend on the previous one. This situation does not represents
the phenomenon of aging which is very important for reliability theory. Intuitively, ag-
ing represents an increase of failure risk as a function of time in use. To introduce this
dependency, the following definition of reliability can be used [47]:







In the case of the Weibull distribution which is used to represent several physical phe-










where β and η are the shape and scale parameters, respectively.
The popularity of this distribution stands on the fact that, depending on the parameters,
it may describe both increasing and decreasing failure rates.
The gamma distribution is especially useful for reliability modeling of those asset life-
times which degradation can be explained by the shock accumulation [47].
The lognormal distribution is a continuous probability distribution of a random variable
whose logarithm is normally distributed. The lognormal distribution is applied to the
description of the dispersion of the component failure rate data.
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Table 3.1 presents some of the most widely distribution functions used in reliability the-
ory and summarizes their pdf , cdf , reliability functions, and hazard rates.
TABLE 3.1: Common used continuous distributions.
Distribution Formulae References
Exponential f(t) =λe−λt, t ≥ 0
F (t) =1− e−λt (3.11)
R(t) =e−λt, t ≥ 0
h(t) =λ
Deloux, Castanier, et al. [33],
Finkelstein [43], Guenab, We-
ber, et al. [58], Khelassi, Theil-
liol, et al. [73–75], Oliveira
and Yoneyama [115], and Wu,





























Bicking, Weber, et al. [9],
Grosso, Ocampo, et al. [54],
Jiang and Jardine [67], Khela-
ssi, Jiang, et al. [72], and Tos-























Çinlar [19], Langeron, Grall, et
al. [82], Lawless and Crowder



















R(t) =1− Φ(ln t− µ
σ
) (3.21)
h(t) = f(t)1− Φ [(ln t− µ) /σ] (3.22)
Chen and Zheng [24],
Langeron, Grall, et al. [82], and
Meeker, Escobar, et al. [103]
From the reliability theory, another useful concepts like the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
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and Availability will be explained. The MTTF is the expected life of the device and it can
be evaluated through the following standard equation [34]:









For repairable devices, the MTTF represents the mean time to the first failure. After it is
repaired and put into operation again, the average time to the next failure is indicated by
the mean time between failures (MTBF). Under perfect repairs, MTBF is equal to MTTF.
Since there is usually an aging effect in most devices, MTBF decreases as more failures
are experienced by the device. The time needed to perform a repair is called mean time
to repair (MTTR). Then, it is possible to define the availability as:
Definition 3.3. Availability: The availability is defined as the probability that the device
is available when is needed and is often used as a measure of its performance.
It is expressed as:
A = MTTF
MTTF + MTTR . (3.24)
The failure rate of many devices exhibits the bathtub curve shown in Figure 3.2 which is
divided into three sections [78]:
FIGURE 3.2: Bathtub curve of hazard rate.
• In the interval (0, t1), which is usually short, a decreasing-failure-rate (DFR) is ob-
served. This is often referred to as the early failure period and the failures that occur
in this interval are called early failures, burn-in failures, or infant mortality failures.
They are mainly due to manufacturing defects and can be eliminated using burn-in
techniques.
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• In the interval (t1, t2), the failure rate is not completely constant, although it is often
assumed to be constant. This period is often referred to as the useful life of the
asset or the constant-failure-rate period. The failures that occur in this interval are
called chance failures or random failures. They are usually caused by chance events
like accidents, overloading, and a combination of the underlying complex physical
failure mechanisms.
• In the interval (t2, t∞), the failure rate is increasing. This period is often called
the increasing-failure-rate (IFR) period or the wear-out failure period. The failures
that occur in this period are due to wear-out, aging, or serious deterioration of the
device. The life of the device is close to its end once entering this period unless
there is preventive maintenance or major overhauls to revitalize the device.
The bathtub curve represents the behaviors of the failure or hazard rate according time
in three different intervals of the asset life. These intervals could be modeled using some
of the distribution functions presented in Table 3.1.
In this thesis, the exponential function distribution will be used to model the reliability
of the devices because of its constant failure rate property. It is an excellent model for the
long flat “useful life” portion of the bathtub curve. In fact, most components and systems
spend most of their lifetimes in this portion of the bathtub curve.
3.2 Reliability modeling
3.2.1 Reliability models with covariates
The term covariate comes from statistics and refers to a variable that is possible to predict
as the result of a study. In reliability theory, a covariate is used to model or explain (also
known as explanatory variable) the influence of different risk factors over the failure rate
(hazard) of the assets [53].
In reliability models, the covariates are used to model the effect of internal process vari-
ables or environmental factors, such as voltage, temperature, humidity, vibration, fre-
quency, usage, among others. The reliability models with covariates are classified into
two groups, the non-parametric and the semi-parametric models [53]. A brief review on
them is given below.
The non-parametric models are used to avoid unrealistic assumptions when the form
of degradation path or distribution of degradation measure is unspecified, or when the
failure data involves complex distributions, or when the volume of observations is small
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and the accurate fitting to a known distribution is difficult. There are for instance the
following models:
• Proportional Hazard Model (PrHM): This model estimates the effects of different
covariates affecting the MTTF of a system. Most of the models used to estimate the
hazard of an asset are based on this model proposed by Cox [30], a review on them
can be found in [77].
The PrHM is expressed as [30]:
h(t, z) = h0(t)ψ(γz), (3.25)
where, h0(t) is the unspecified baseline hazard function which is dependent on
time only and without influence of covariates. The positive functional term, ψ(γz),
is dependent on the effects of different factors, which have multiplicative effect on
the baseline hazard function. The covariate function, ψ(γz), is represented by a row
vector consisting of regression coefficients γ and a column vector consisting of the
covariates z. In this case, unlikely to the assumption made in Figure 3.2, the hazard
rate is not constant.
• Additive Hazard Model (AHM): Additive hazard model is expressed as:
h(t, z) = h0(t) + ψ(γz), (3.26)
where the positive or negative functional term, ψ(γz), is dependent on the effects
of different factors, which have an additive effect on the baseline hazard function.
This model provides the means for modeling a circumstance when the hazard is
not zero at time zero.
• Mixed Additive-Multiplicative Model: this model contains both a multiplicative
and an additive components and specifies that the hazard is associated with a mul-
tidimensional covariate process z = (W T , XT )T and takes the form [93]:
h(t|z) = g{βT0 W (t)}+ h0(t)f{γT0 X(t)}, (3.27)
with θ0 = [βT0 , γT0 ]T being a vector of unknown regression coefficients, g and f are
known link functions and h0 is an unspecified baseline hazard function under g = 0
and 1.
• Accelerated Failure Time Model: this model is used to obtain reliability and fail-
ure rate estimates of devices and components in a much shorter time. It can be
expressed as [151]:
Y = log(t) = µ(z) + σε, (3.28)
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where Y = log(t) is the lifetime (assumed to be log), z is the applied stress vector
which distribution has a location parameter µ(z) and a constant scale parameter σ,
σ > 0 and ε is a random variable whose distribution does not depend on z.
• Proportional Intensity Model (PIM): this model was introduced by Cox [30] and
is intended to model the failures and repairs processes of repairable systems which
incorporate explanatory variables, covariates or markers [68, 97], which are influ-
encing factors such as stress, temperature, humidity, vibration, and use rate. It is
described by:
h(t|N(t), z(t)) = h0j(t) exp(z(t),γj), (3.29)
whereN(t) represents a random variable for the number of failure in (0, t], and z(t)
denotes the covariate process up to time t. h(t|N(t), z(t)) and h0j(t) are the intensity
function and the baseline intensity function, respectively, and γj is the regression
coefficient for the jth stratum.
• Proportional Covariates Model: proposed by Sun, Ma, et al. [156] it overcomes
some shortcomings of proportional hazard model, it assumes that the covariate of
a system is proportional to the hazard of the system. The generic expression is:
Zr(t) = C(t)h(t), (3.30)
where the covariate function and the baseline covariate function, both depending
on time are represented by Zr(t) and C(t), respectively, and h(t) represents the
hazard of the system. This expression indicates that the covariates of a system
changes when the hazard of this system changes.
In contrast, in semi-parametric models, the paths degradation form or degradation dis-
tribution are known or partially specified. These models can be specified as:
• Weibull Proportional Hazard Model (WPHM): the Weibull Proportional Hazard
Model is based on PrHM when the failure is assumed to follow a Weibull distribu-
tion. This model is expressed as [63, 187]:







where β > 0 and η > 0 are the shape and scale parameter of the Weibull distribu-
tion, respectively.
• Logistic Regression Model (LRM): this model is used to relate the probability of
an event to a set of covariates. Given the current degradation features z(t), and as-
suming the odds ratio between the reliability functionR(t|z(t)) and the cumulative
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distribution function F (t|z(t)) = 1−R(t|z(t)) [92]:
R(t|z(t))
1−R(t|z(t)) = exp(α+ γz(t)), (3.32)
where α > 0 and γ are the model parameters to be estimated. Then the reliability
expression is given by:
R(t|z(t)) = exp(α+ γz(t))1 + exp(α+ γz(t)) . (3.33)
3.2.2 Models for degradation data
A degradation process, also known as deterioration, wear or aging, of physical com-
ponents, is generally inevitable in engineering systems and, it can be originated due to
mechanical contact, shocks, usage, and environmental agents such as temperature, hu-
midity, vibration, etc. The degradation of a component can lead to a loss of reliability,
which can be viewed as a reduction in performance or efficiency levels which can gener-
ate a system failure or shut-down. The rate at which deterioration occurs is a function of
time and/or usage intensity [14, 155]. Hence, the monitoring of components degradation
level in complex systems is of great importance. [53].
The degradation occurrence is a kind of stochastic process which could be modeled in
several approaches. Generally, the degradation models are built from degradation data
by fitting it to a model or distribution. A very comprehensive review on degradation
models in reliability can be found in [52], where the authors classify them into two ma-
jor groups according to how degradation data is collected, i.e., data obtained in normal
operation and data obtained under accelerated conditions.
i) Normal degradation models: these models are built from data obtained at normal
operating conditions. These models can be classified into two groups: degradation
models with and without stress factors.
• Degradation models without stress factors are for example the general degra-
dation path model, random process model, linear/nonlinear regression mod-
els, mixture model, and time series model; in which the degradation measure
is not a function of a defined stress and the related reliability is estimated at
fixed level of stress [172].
Stress-Strength Interference model (SSI): in this model, the stress has a
random dispersion Y , which results from the applied loads. This dispersion
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is modeled by a distribution function HY (z). Hence, asset reliability can be
described as [106]:













where GX(x) is a random dispersion in inherent asset strength (X).
This model implies that asset reliability corresponds to the event that strength
exceeds stress. In [183] the authors classify the SSI models into three groups:
deterministic degradation, random strength degradation process [59] and up-
per and lower bounds [158].
Cumulative damage/shock model: in this model, it is assumed that the
damage threshold (strength) is constant and the stress (damage) is variable.
It is based on cumulative damage theory for a degradation process exposed
to discrete stress. It is assumed that an asset is subjected to shocks that occur
randomly in time. Each shock imparts a quantity Xi of damage to the asset,
which fails when a threshold is exceeded. The reliability R(t) over time can be









here G is the distribution of the amount of damage per shock, k is the number
of shocks that occur over the interval [0, t], and D is the threshold.
• Degradation models with stress factors: in these models, the degradation mea-
sure is a function of a defined stress. Degradation models with stress fac-
tors are for example the stress-strength inference model, cumulative dam-
age/shock model, and diffusion process model; where the degradation mea-
sure is a function of a defined stress.
General degradation path model: the general degradation path model
fits the degradation observation by a regression model with random coeffi-
cients [67]. Lu and Meeker [95] develop a Monte Carlo simulation procedure
to calculate an estimate of the distribution function of the time-to-failure, and
they propose the following general assumptions in which the test and mea-
surement should be conducted:
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(a) Sample assets are randomly selected from a population or production pro-
cess and random measurement errors are independent across time and
assets.
(b) Sample assets are tested in a particular homogeneous environment (e.g.,
the same constant temperature).
(c) The measurement (or inspection) times are prespecified. They are the
same across all the test assets, and may or may not be equally spaced
in time. This assumption is used for constructing confidence intervals for
the time-to-failure distribution.
For each asset in a random set of size n, it is assumed that degradation mea-
surements are available for prespecified times (t1, t2, ..., ts). Generally, until
the observed degradation path (z) crosses a prespecified critical level D or un-
til time ts, which comes first. The sample path of the ith asset at time tj is
given by:
zij = ηij + εij = η(tj ; Φ,Θi) + εij i = 1, 2, ..., n, (3.36)
εij ∼ N(0, σ2ε), j = 1, 2, ...,mΘi ≤ m, (3.37)
where tj is the time of the jth measurement; ηij is the actual path of the ith as-
set at time tj ; εij is the measurement error with constant variance σ2ε ; Φ is the
vector of fixed effect parameters common for all assets; Θi is the ith asset ran-
dom effect parameter vector that represents individual asset characteristics; m
is the total number of possible measurements in the experiment; and mΘi is
the total number of measurements of the ith asset.
Assuming that Θi (i = 1, 2, ..., n) follows a multivariate distribution function
GΘ(·). The distribution function of T , the failure time, can be written as:
Pr(T ≤ t) = FT (t) = FT (t; Φ, GΘ(·), D, η). (3.38)
Random process model: this kind of model fits the degradation measures
at each observation by a specific distribution with time-dependent parameters
[184]. This method collects multiple degradation data at a certain time and
treats it as dispersed points. The observations at time instant tj are assumed
to follow a S-normal distribution with µ(ti) and σ(ti). To find the equation
for µ(t) and σ(t) a linear regression is used. Assuming that the degradation
measure at time t follows a Weibull distribution with constant shape β and
time-dependent scale parameter η(t) = b exp(−at), the reliability function can
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be described as:






where, a and b are constants, X(t) is degradation level at time t, and D is the
threshold level.
Mixture model for hard and soft failures: this method consists in ob-
taining two observation samples: catastrophic failures (hard) and degradation
(soft), and then builds a mixture model with both data [191]. This can be mod-
eled as:
F (t) = p(z)Fc(t) + [1− p(z)]Fd(t), (3.40)
where, F (t) is the cumulative density function (cdf ) of t, p(z) is the proportion
of components failed catastrophically within specified observed degradation
value z, Fc(t) and Fd(t) are respectively the catastrophic failure cdf of t and
degradation failure cdf of t (lifetime).
Time series model: it is a technique used to predict individual system
performance reliability in real-time considering multiple failure modes. It in-
cludes an on-line multivariate monitoring and anticipation (using a Kalman
filter) of selected performance measures and conditional performance reliabil-
ity estimates [96].
Other commonly used degradation models: Brownian motion (or Wiener
process) and Gamma processes are continuous-time models that are appropri-
ate for modeling continuous degradation processes. Nowadays, these models
as well as Markov models are widely applied as degradation modeling tech-
niques [14, 71, 89, 98, 112, 128, 153].
ii) Accelerated degradation models: accelerated degradation models provide infor-
mation about reliability at normal conditions using degradation data obtained at
an accelerated time with or without stress conditions. Degradation process can be
very slow in an industrial application at normal stress level and have a high MTBF,
which makes difficult to estimate the failure time distribution of components with
high-reliability [103, 161, 185].
Therefore, to obtain data quickly from a degradation test, an accelerated life test is
performed. This test consists in applying an increasing level of acceleration vari-
ables, such as vibration amplitude, temperature, corrosive media, load, voltage,
pressure [150]. However, this kind of tests is a costly approach.
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General assumptions of accelerated degradation models are:
(a) Degradation is not a reversible process.
(b) A model applies to a single degradation process, mechanism, or failure mode.
(c) Degradation of a test asset’s performance before the test starts is negligible.
(d) The failure processes at higher stress levels are the same as at the design or use
stress levels.
Accelerated degradation models can be physics-based or statistical based. In the
following, a quick review on those categories is presented.
• Physics-based models: these models are used for accelerated life tests when
the deterioration is caused by thermal and non-thermal parameters, speed,
load, corrosive environment, vibration amplitude, etc., in order to estimate
their service lives. Applications can include dielectrics, semiconductors, bat-
tery cells, lubricant, plastic, insulating fluids, capacitors, bearings, and spin-
dles.
Arrhenius model: this model is used when the damage is caused by tem-
perature, especially for: dielectrics [49], semi-conductors [103, 123], battery
cells, lubricant, and plastic.. In general, it is used to describe many products
that fail as a result of degradation due to chemical reactions or metal diffusion.
The nominal time τ to failure is [108]:
τ = A e
E
(k T ) , (3.41)
whereE is the activation energy of the reaction in eV, k is the Boltzmann’s con-
stant, 8.3171× 105 eV/K, T is the absolute Kelvin temperature, A is a constant
that depends on product geometry, specimen size and fabrication, test method
and others factors.
Eyring model: this model is used for accelerated life test with respect to
the thermal and non-thermal variable. The Eyring relationship for nominal





(k T ) , (3.42)
here A and B are constant parameters of the product and test method, and k
is Boltzmann’s constant. For the small range of absolute temperature in most
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applications, (A/T is essentially constant, and (3.42) is close to the Arrhenius
relationship (3.41)).
Inverse power model: this model is used to analyze accelerated life test
data of many electronic and mechanical components such as insulating fluids,
capacitors, bearings, and spindles in order to estimate their service lives when
the acceleration operating parameters are non-thermal e.g. speed, load, cor-
rosive medium, and vibration amplitude [69, 148]. It is based on the inverse
power law relationship between nominal life τ of a product and the accelerat-
ing variable V , and it is expressed as:
τ(V ) = A
V γ1
, (3.43)
here A and γ1 are parameters characteristics of the product, specimen geome-
try and fabrication, the test method, etc.
• Statistics-based models: these models have been developed to estimate the
hazard of assets with covariates in both the reliability and biomedical fields.
A review on statistics-based models can be found in [53].
In these methods, techniques as standard regressions can be applied to most
aging degradation data, as such data are usually complete. However, these
models are usually nonlinear in the parameters. In such cases, nonlinear re-
gression methods must be used, which introduces considerable complexity
[7].
3.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, the link between reliability and degradation has been explained, followed
by a literature review on reliability modeling and degradation models for reliability es-
timation. The degradation modeling consists in fitting degradation data to a model or a
probability distribution. The degradation data can be obtained at the normal operating
condition or at accelerated ones.
The reliability modeling approaches are related to probability distributions. In this sense,
the choice of the probability distribution depends on the application, asset and, system
nature.
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The hazard model with covariates is one of the most common statistical models in relia-
bility and survival analysis. Some of them have been presented and grouped into non-
parametric and semi-parametric models. In such a way, an explanation about covariates
and how they explain the failure rate and its integration into probability distributions has
been addressed.
Some models to specific physical system have been reviewed, those models can be used
to fit degradation data by adjusting parameters.
In this thesis, the exponential distribution will be used to model the reliability of the as-
sets and their aging phenomenon as described in (3.9). Moreover, the hazard models with
covariates will be used to explain the aging process, particularly, the PrHM proposed by
[30] because it can explain the degradation process of a large variety of physical systems
in a simplified way.
Chapter 4
Reliability Assessment
This chapter addresses the reliability modeling and assessment of dynamic
system using structure function, Bayesian and Dynamic Bayesian networks.
This chapter also presents the complexity of reliability modeling and how the
inference algorithms are able to handle it. Reliability Importance Measures
as indicators of components importance into the system reliability are also
presented and explained. All these concepts are then illustrated through an
example consisting of a Drinking Water Network system.
4.1 System reliability
Generally, systems are composed by subsystems or components. If the state of the sub-
systems or components can be known, the state of the system can also be known. System
structure can be explained through two fundamental relations: series and parallel [60].
Only binary components will be considered, i.e. components having only two states:
operational (up) and failed (down). Let xi denote the state of component i, where i =
1, . . . , n and,
xi =
{
1 if component i is up
0 if component i is down
. (4.1)
Also, it will be assumed that the system can only have two states: up or down. The
dependence of a system state on the states of its components will be determined by means
the so-called structure function.
The structure function allows to determine the dependency of the state of the system
regarding the state of its components. This function, denoted as Φ(x), indicates the status
of the system (success or failure) given the state of each component.
Now, let x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) denotes the state of the n components. It can have one of 2n
values which correspond to the possible combinations of the states (working or failed)
47
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for the n components. Therefore, the state of the system is characterized by Φ(x) which
is a binary value function where
Φ(x) =
{
1 if the system is in working state
0 if the system is in failed state
. (4.2)
4.1.1 Reliability of series and parallel systems
A serial system is called to be up if and only if all its components are up (see Figure 4.1(a)).
Formally, the reliability of a serial system is denoted as:




A parallel system is called to be up if and only if one of its components is up (see Fig-
ure 4.1(b)). Formally, the reliability of a parallel system is denoted as:





FIGURE 4.1: Representation of series (a) and parallel (b) systems.
For instance, the structure function can be computed using either the minimal path sets
(P1, P2, . . . , Ps) which are the minimal sets of elements of the system whose functioning
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Or the minimal cut sets (C1, C2, . . . , Ck) which are the minimal sets of elements of the








Now, let us assume that the state of the ith component is described by a binary random
variable Xi, defined by
Pr(Xi = 1) = pi,Pr(Xi = 0) = qi = 1− pi. (4.7)
where 1 corresponds to the operational (up) state and 0 corresponds to the failure (down)
state.
It will be assumed that all components are mutually independent. This implies a consid-
erable simplification, due that for independent components, the joint distribution of X1,
X2, . . . , Xn, is completely determined by components reliabilities p1, p2, . . . , pn.
Let X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) be the system state vector, which is a random vector. Con-
sequently, the system structure function Φ(X) = Φ(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) becomes a binary
random variable, i.e. Φ(X) = 1 corresponds to the system up state and Φ(X) = 0 corre-
sponds to the system down state.
Hence, the system reliability (r0) is the probability that the system structure function
equals 1:
r0 = Pr(Φ(X) = 1). (4.8)
Since, Φ(·) is a binary random variable, it can be written as:
r0 = E [Φ(X)] . (4.9)
Therefore, in a serial system, its structure function is given by Φ(X) =
∏n
i=1Xi. Thus:




And a parallel system, its structure function is given by Φ(X) = 1−
∏n
i=1(1−Xi). Thus:
r0 = E [Φ(X)] = 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− pi) . (4.11)
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A series system does not have any redundancy because there is only one way for the
system to work properly; that is, all components have to work properly. In a parallel
system, there are 2n − 1 different ways for the system to work properly in which each
component constitutes a different way [78].
4.1.2 Reliability of series-parallel systems
There are more complex structures that can be explained as combinations of series and
parallel structures. Nevertheless, in the cases where such structure reduction cannot be
performed, e.g. the case of bridge structure (Figure 4.2), the pivotal decomposition ap-
proach is used to compute the system reliability.
FIGURE 4.2: Bridge structure.
Let (αi; p) denote the vector p with its ith component replaced by αi. Hence, (1i; p) =
(p1, ..., pi−l, 1, pi+l, . . . , pn).
The pivotal decomposition method consists in computing the reliability of the system
pivoting around a component by taking it as fully reliable (up) or completely unreliable
(down). In this way, the problem is reduced to compute the system reliability of serial
and parallel systems.
Example 4.1.1. Consider the bridge structure system shown in Figure 4.2. The best choice
is to pivot around element 3. Suppose that component 3 is up. Then the bridge becomes
a series connection of two parallel subsystems consisting of elements 1, 2 and 4, 5, respec-
tively. Its reliability is
r(13; p) = [1− (1− p1)(1− p2)][1− (1− p4)(1− p5)]. (4.12)
Now, consider that component 3 is down, then the bridge becomes a parallel connection
of two series systems: one with components 1, 4 and the second with components 2, 5.
Its reliability is r(03; p) = 1 − (1 − p1p4)(1 − p2p5). Therefore, the system reliability is
ro = p3r(13; p) + (1− p3)r(03; p).
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The final result is:
ro = E[Φ(X)] = p1p3p5 + p2p3p4 + p2p5 + p1p4 − p1p2p3p5 (4.13)
− p1p2p4p5 − p1p3p4p5 − p1p2p3p4 − p2p3p4p5 + 2p1p2p3p4p5. (4.14)
The same results can be obtained by using minimal cuts and path sets. For example, the
bridge has four minimal path sets: {1, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 4}, and {2, 5}. Thus, the random
structure function is:
Φ(X) = 1− (1−X1X3X5)(1−X2X3X4)(1−X2X5)(1−X1X4). (4.15)
Finally, the terms in parentheses are expanded, the expression is simplified using the fact
that Xki = Xi and replacing the reliability of each component.
4.2 Reliability assessment using BNs
4.2.1 Bayesian Networks
Basically, a Bayesian Networks (BN) computes the probability distribution in a set of vari-
ables according to the prior knowledge of some variables and the observation of others
[65]. The BNs are also called as Direct Acyclic Graphs (DAGs).
Let A and B be two nodes with two possible states (S1 and S2, see Figure 4.3). A prob-
ability is associated to each state of the node. This probability is defined a priori for root
nodes and computed by inference for the others. The a priori probabilities of node A are
Pr(A=SA1) and Pr(A=SA2).
A Conditional Probability Table (CPT) is associated to node B and defines the conditional
probability of the state of B given the state of A (Pr(B|A)). Thus, the BN inference com-
putes the marginal distribution Pr(B=SB1):
Pr(B = SB1) =Pr(B = SB1|A = SA1)Pr(A = SA1)
+ Pr(B = SB1|A = SA2)Pr(A = SA2).
(4.16)
In the Bayesian network approach the probabilistic interactions of the components of a
system are represented using a DAG which nodes represent the variables and the arcs
between nodes represent the causal relationships between variables [35]. Basically, BNs
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compute the probability distribution in a set of variables according to the prior knowl-
edge of some variables and the observation of others [66].
FIGURE 4.3: Basic Bayesian Network.
A Conditional Probability Table (CPT) is associated with node B and defines the condi-
tional probability of the state of B given the state of A (Pr(B|A)) (Table 4.1). The condi-
tional probability is a measure of the probability of an event given that another event has
occurred.




SA1 Pr(B = SB1|A = SA1) Pr(B=SB2|A = SB1)
SA2 Pr(B = SB1|A = SA2) Pr(B=SB2|A = SB2)
4.2.2 Inference mechanism
Bayesian networks are easy to use thanks to their graphical interpretation. But, the prob-
abilistic inference mechanism constitutes their real strength. The inference of a BN is able
to compute the marginal probability distribution of any variable according to:
• Observation or measurements of variables (evidence).
• The likelihood regarding the state of certain variables.
• The conditional probability distribution between variables.
In this thesis, the BN and DBN models have been programed using the Bayes Net toolbox
[104], which supports many different inference algorithms, such as:
• Exact inference for static BNs:
junction tree
variable elimination
brute force enumeration (for discrete nets)
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linear algebra (for Gaussian nets)
Pearl’s algorithm (for polytrees)




• Exact inference for DBNs:
junction tree
frontier algorithm
forwards-backwards (for Hidden Markov Models (HMMs))
• Approximate inference for DBNs:
Boyen-Koller
factored-frontier/loopy belief propagation
The inference algorithms explanation are outside the scope of this thesis. Although, more
information can be found in [65, 120].
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that all inference mechanisms use the Bayes theorem
to propagate the probabilities on the variables and to update the probabilities of all the
variables given the observations of states or likelihoods of states.
Nowadays, the current research on inference algorithms is focused on their efficiency,
in reducing the computing time needed when handling complex models with a high
number of variables.
4.2.3 Dynamic Bayesian Networks
A special case of Bayesian Network called Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) is used
to model the time dependency of a process. In a DBN the random variables are time
indexed, so the process state SA : {sA1 , ..., sAM} is represented by nodes Ak and Ak+∆t at
time instants k and k + ∆t, respectively. The time dependence is represented by an arc
and the temporal evolution of the variables is represented by successive time slices as
shown in Figure 4.4 (for simplicity let ∆t be equal to 1).
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The transition probability between the states of the variable at time instant k to k + 1
is defined by a CPT inter-time slices. Given the probability distribution Pr(Ak) at time
instant k, the network leads by inference to a unique distribution Pr(Ak+1) at time instant
k + 1. The computation over time of Pr(Ak) is performed by iterative inferences starting
from k = 0 and Pr(A0) [8].
FIGURE 4.4: DBN model for the ith component.
4.2.4 Component reliability
Recall from Section 3.1 that reliability is the probability that a system will perform its
functioning satisfactorily for a given period of time and under stated operating condi-
tions.




where λi is the failure rate that is obtained from the ith component under different levels
of load. In discrete-time, the reliability can be expressed as:








where Ts is the sampling time.
The decay of the components reliability can be modeled using a Markov chain (MC)
process. This type of process is very useful in system reliability modeling due to its
memoryless property, which means, that the state transitions only depend on the current
and next state, and it does not depend on the previous state or the amount of time that the
process has stayed in the current state, making it an effective tool for system reliability
analysis [176].
Let ei be a discrete random variable in the Markov process representing the state of the
ith component with two possible mutually exclusive states, i.e. up (Up) and down (Dn).
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where p12 ∼= λ∆t : λ represents a constant failure rate and ∆t the time interval, and p12
can be interpreted as the probability that the component goes from state Up to Dn after
∆t.
In the case of components whose failure rate depends on time, their reliability can be
modeled by a semi- Markov chain.
The MC is homogeneous if the transition probabilities of the states are independent on
time. In a semi-Markov chain, the memoryless property is relaxed, which means that
the state transition depends on the current state and the transition time. Therefore, the
probability matrix (4.18) becomes dependent on time:






FIGURE 4.5: Semi-Markov chain for the component reliability.
From (4.19) it is clear that the failure rate is the probability of component state to be Dn
at instant time k + 1 given that its state was Up at time k, this is:
λi(k) = Pr(ei(k + 1) = Dn|ei(k) = Up). (4.20)
If the state at next instant time (k + 1) is used then to compute the state at instant time
(k + 2) and so on, the MC is transformed into a semi-Markov chain (Figure 4.5).
The semi-Markov chain is modeled by a Dynamic Bayesian Network with a CPT evolving
according to time. In this case the evolution is represented in two time slices (Figure 4.6)
[8].
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FIGURE 4.6: DBN model for the ith component.
Therefore, DBN computes the component reliability using:
Ri(k + 1) = Pr(ei(k + 1) = Up). (4.21)
which follows expression (4.17).
4.2.5 System reliability modeling using BN
The use of BNs to reliability modeling allows to model several structures based on min-
imal path/cut sets, or logical combination of components states by using AND or OR
gates [78].
Let ei be a random variable representing the state of the ith component denoted as:
Pr(Xi = 1) = Pr(ei = Up); Pr(Xi = 0) = Pr(ei = Dn). (4.22)
Assume that the state of the components are known, once the minimal path sets of the
system are identified, its states (i.e., if the minimal path set is up or down) are represented
by a random variable as a node in the DBN. The state of the components of the system are
also represented as nodes in the DBN and are connected to their respective minimal path
set node. Note that the probabilities of the component states are computed by inferences
in the DBN modeling of the semi Markov chain described above.
Finally, the state of the system (i.e., system reliability) is represented by a random variable
in the top node of the BN which is connected to the minimal path set nodes (Figure 4.8).
Example 4.2.1. For example, consider the system presented in Figure 4.7 composed by
three components. It is clear that with a minimum of two components the system can
performs its function (link point A to point B) satisfactorily, being {1, 3} and {2, 3} the
minimal path sets of the system.
Then, it is possible to build a BN of the system reliability from its minimal path sets (see
Figure 4.8), being ei the probability of the ith component state, Pi the probability of the
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FIGURE 4.7: Three components system example.
state of the ith minimal path set and S the probability of the system state [177].
FIGURE 4.8: Bayesian Network of system reliability.
Table 4.2 presents the CPT of node P1. P1 depends on the states of the components e1
and e3 and its behavior corresponds to an AND gate, i.e., all the components in a success
path should be available for the system to be available. Node P2 has another CPT which
depends on the states of components e2 and e3.




Up Up 1 0
Up Dn 0 1
Dn Up 0 1
Dn Dn 0 1
Table 4.3 presents the CPT of node S. It depends on the state of success path nodes P1
and P2 and has the behavior of an OR gate, i.e., if there is at least one success path up,
then the system will be up.
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Up Up 1 0
Up Dn 1 0
Dn Up 1 0
Dn Dn 0 1
It is possible then to compute the probability distribution for each variable conditioned
by the values of the other variables in the graph. This feature is particularly important
in case a control system must work in real-time, because in that case evidences acquired
about a state variable must be propagated to update the state of the rest of the domain.
Therefore, the reliability of the system (R) is computed using the BN as:
R = Pr(S = Up). (4.23)
In the case of complex structure systems with high amount of components the computing
of the structure function becomes non trivial.
4.3 Drinking Water Network example
Drinking Water Networks (DWN) are usually constituted of a large number of intercon-
nected components that may be classified as active or passive components. The active el-
ements are those which can be commanded to control the flow and/or the pressure of wa-
ter in particular sections of the system, such as pumps and valves. The passive elements
are those that cannot be directly commanded, such as pipes and tanks. These elements
transport water to demand nodes from the potable water sources at specific pressure
levels to satisfy the consumers demand. Moreover, DWNs systems require appropriate
instrumentation to perform real-time control actions over the network and manage its
performance. Usually, they are managed in a hierarchical control structure which deliv-
ers the appropriate control actions to the pumping stations or valves, and local controllers
ensure the correct execution and meet the specific requirements in the network.
A WDN can be represented as the one of Figure 4.9, which is composed by sources (water
supplies), water demand sectors, and pipelines which interconnect them. It also contains
active elements like pumps and valves. The considered DWN corresponds to a subnet-
work of the Barcelona water transport network [178].











FIGURE 4.9: Drinking water network diagram.
This network consists of 5 sources and 1 sink. It is assumed that the demand forecast
at the sink (dm(k)) is known (Figure 4.10), and that any single source can satisfy this re-
quired water demand. It is also assumed that the volume of the tanks should be between
a minimum and maximum safety levels.
















FIGURE 4.10: Drinking water demand.
Regarding the reliability of a DWN, in the literature, it is classified into two main cate-
gories. The first one, named hydraulic reliability, is related to the probability that a DWN
can supply the consumer demands over a specified time interval under specified environ-
mental conditions, i.e., the transport of desired quantities and qualities of water at required
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pressures to desired appropriate locations at desired appropriate times. The second one,
named topological reliability, refers to the probability that a given network is physically
connected given the mechanical reliabilities of its components [119].
This thesis and the methodology proposed here are focused only on the topological re-
liability. Moreover, the reliability modeling illustrated here concerns only to the active
components which can be directly commanded.
The DWN reliability is modeled using a DBN as follows: first, system components must
be identified. In this case there are 10 pumps, 5 sources, 4 tanks and several pipes.
Secondly, the minimal path sets should be determined. A minimal path set is composed
by those components which allow a flow path between sources and sinks, such as pipes,
tanks and pumps. A list of the components that correspond to each minimal path set is
presented in Table 4.4. There are nine minimal path sets in the system of Figure 4.9. Each
minimal path set is available depending on the reliability of its components.
TABLE 4.4: Components and minimal path sets relationship.
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9 e10
P1 × × ×
P2 × × ×
P3 × × ×
P4 × × × ×
P5 × × × ×
P6 × × × × ×
P7 × × × ×
P8 × × × ×
P9 × × × × ×
Note that pipes and tanks are considered perfectly reliable so they do not provide signifi-
cant information to the network. Nevertheless, sources are included in the minimal path
sets merely for illustrating the procedure.
Provided the information of Table 4.4, the DBN presented in Figure 4.11 is built as fol-
lows: nodes ei and Ai are drawn for each component. Note that nodes ei have two time
slices in time k and k + 1 following the approach of Section 4.2.4.
Then, these nodes are interconnected to their minimal path set nodes Pi using arcs. Fi-
nally, each minimal path set node is interconnected to the system reliability node S [178].
Initially, at instant k = 0, the pumps and the system are assumed to be fully reliable, i.e.
their reliability is 1. Then, the probability of each node is computed using their CPT.
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FIGURE 4.11: Dynamic Bayesian network model of the DWN.
At each sampling time, the reliabilityRi of each pump is computed according to its failure
rate using a MC (Figure 4.11). Its behavior follows an exponential distribution as stated
in (3.9). Note that it is independent of the previous states of the component. It only
depends on its present state. In the DBN, this corresponds to the CPT shown in Table 4.5.




Up 1-λ0i · Ts λ0i · Ts
Dn 0 1
The CPT of node P1 is shown in Table 4.6. This CPT depends on the states of the source
1 (A1) and pumps 1 and 5 (e1, e5). Its behavior corresponds to an AND gate.
It is assumed that with one source it is possible to satisfy the water demand. Thus, the
availability of the system can be assured as long as at least one of paths Pi is available,
which corresponds to the CPT of node S shown in Table 4.7. It depends on the state of
nodes P1 to P9 and has the behavior of an OR gate.
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TABLE 4.6: CPTs for nodes P1.
A1 e1(k + 1) e6(k + 1)
P1
Up Dn
Up Up Up 1 0
Up Up Dn 0 1
Up Dn Up 0 1
Up Dn Dn 0 1
Dn Up Up 0 1
Dn Up Dn 0 1
Dn Dn Up 0 1
Dn Dn Dn 0 1
TABLE 4.7: CPT for node S.
P1 P2 P3 . . . P9
S
Up Dn
Up Up Up . . . Up 1 0
Up Up Up . . . Dn 1 0








Dn Dn Dn . . . Dn 0 1
4.4 Reliability Importance Measures
There are indices that can be used to take actions according to the analysis made of the
system reliability and availability. These measures are frequently of significant value in
performing trade-off analysis in system design or suggesting the most efficient way to
operate and maintain a system or prioritizing improvement efforts.
Reliability importance measures were first introduced by [12], and they are classified into
two groups: Reliability Importance Measures (RIMs) and Structural Importance Mea-
sures (SIMs). The RIMs evaluate the relative importance of a component taking into ac-
count its contribution to the overall system reliability while the SIMs provide the relative
importance of a component taking into account its position into the system structure.
These metrics can be defined either according to their functional aspect, taking into ac-
count the minimal path sets, or according to their dysfunctional aspect, considering the
minimal cut sets. As both are equivalent, in this thesis only the functional aspect is used.
The aim from the system reliability analysis point of view, is to use the RIMs to identify
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the weakness or strengths in the system and to quantify the impact of component failures
over system functioning.
4.4.1 Birnbaum’s Importance Measure
The Birnbaum importance measure [12] also known as Marginal Importance Factor (MIF)
is related to the probability of a component to be critical for the system functioning. It is
defined as:
Definition 4.1. The B-reliability importance of component i for the functioning of the sys-
tem, denoted as IB(i; p), for a coherent system with independent components is defined
as:





The notation R(1i; p) denotes the reliability of the system in which the ith components is
replaced by an absolutely reliable one, while R(0i; p) denotes the reliability of the system
in which the ith component is failed.
The Birnbaum’s measure is the probability that the failure or functioning of the ith com-
ponent coincides with system failure or functioning. This approach is well known from
classical sensitivity analysis. Moreover, it can be interpreted as the maximum lost in sys-
tem reliability when the ith component changes from the condition of perfect functioning
to a failed condition.
Note that Birnbaum’s importance measure (IB(i; p)) of the ith component depends only
on the structure of the system and the reliabilities of the other components. IB(i; p) is
independent of the actual reliability of the ith component (pi). This may be regarded as a
weakness of Birnbaum’s measure.
4.4.2 Critical Reliability Importance Measure
The Critical Reliability Importance, also known as Critical Importance Factor (CIF), was
introduced by Lambert [81] and it is defined as:
Definition 4.2. The critical reliability importance of component i for system function-
ing, denoted by ICIF (i; p), is defined as the probability that ith component works and is
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critical for the system functioning given that the system is functioning.
ICIF (i; p) =pi





Moreover, this can be interpreted as the probability that the ith component has caused a
system failure when it is known that the system is failed.
4.4.3 Fussell-Vesely Reliability Importance Measure
The Fussell-Veselly (FV) importance measure also known as the Diagnostic Importance
Factor (DIF) was proposed initially in the context of fault tree [45, 168]. It is classified
in c-type and p-type. The c-type FV importance, takes into account the contribution of
component to system failure, and its definition is based on minimal cuts. The p-type FV
importance, takes into account the contribution of a component to system functioning,
and it is derived from the minimal path sets. It represents the probability that at least one
minimal path containing the ith component works, given that the system is functioning.
Definition 4.3. The Fussell-Veselly, p-FV (c-FV) reliability importance measure of com-
ponent i, denoted by IpDIF (i; p) (IcDIF (i; p)), is defined as the probability that a minimal
path (cut) containing the ith component exists and causes system function (failure).
IpDIF (i; p) =Pr{∃ P ∈P i s.t.Xj = 1 ∀ j ∈ P |Φ(X) = 1}
=piPr{(1i,X) : ∃P ∈P i s.t. Xj = 1 ∀ j ∈ P }
R(p)
=Pr(Xi = 1|φ(X) = 1)
(4.26)
IcDIF (i; p) =Pr{∃ C ∈ C i s.t.Xj = 0 ∀ j ∈ C|φ(X) = 0}
=qiPr{(0i,X) : ∃ C ∈ Xj = 0 ∀ j ∈ C}1−R(p)
=Pr(0i|φ(X) = 0) = Pr(Xi = 0|φ(X) = 0)
(4.27)
where P ∈P i (C ∈ C i) denotes the minimal path (cut) containing the ith component.
As both are equivalent, the notation IDIF will be used.
IDIF can be interpreted as the probability that the functioning of component i contributes
to the functioning of the system given that the system is not failed.
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4.4.4 Reliability Achievement Worth
The Reliability Achievement Worth (RAW) describes the increase of the system reliability
if the ith component is replaced by a perfect reliable one. It is defined as:
Definition 4.4. The RAW, denoted by IRAW (i; p) qualifies the maximum possible per-
centage of system reliability increase generated by the ith component. It is expressed
as:
IRAW (i; p) =
Pr(Φ(1i,X) = 1)
Pr(Φ(X) = 1)




4.4.5 Reliability Reduction Worth, RRW
The Reliability Reduction Worth (RRW) measure [86] reflects the reduction of system
reliability if the ith component is failed. It is defined as:
Definition 4.5. The RRW, denoted as IRRW (i; p) expresses the potential damage pro-
duced to the system by the failure of the ith component.
IRRW (i; p) =
Pr(Φ(X) = 1)
Pr(Φ(0i,X) = 1)
= Pr(Φ(X) = 1)
Pr(Φ(X) = 1|Xi = 0)
= 11− piR(p)IB(i; p)
. (4.29)
4.5 Example
For the computation of the RIMs consider the DWN system described in Example 4.3. it
is supposed that sources, tanks ans pipelines are perfectly reliable and only actuators are
affected by a loss of reliability according to (3.9).
The aim of computing the RIMs in this example is to know, from different points of view,
the importance of the pumps reliability to the overall system reliability. In this Section it
is done in a static approach, since the failure rate is constant. Later, in Section 6.3.5, the
analysis is done dynamically taking into account the evolution of the failure rate.
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First of all, a static RIM analysis is performed in order to get better knowledge on them.
Component reliability is assumed to follow (3.9) with λi (Table 4.8) and the mission time
is t = TM (2000 hours). The corresponding results are presented in Table 4.9 and Ta-
ble 4.10.
TABLE 4.8: Pump failure rates
λ [h−1 · 10−4]
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10
9.85 10.70 10.50 1.40 0.85 0.80 11.70 0.60 0.74 0.78
TABLE 4.9: Pumps Reliability Importance Measures at TM=2000
Pump λ [·10−4] Ri [%] IB[%] IDIF [%] ICIF [%] IRAW [%] IRRW [%]
p1 9.85 13.94 4.54 14.61 0.77 0.10 0.10
p2 10.70 11.76 4.43 12.32 0.63 0.10 0.10
p3 10.50 12.24 4.45 12.83 0.66 0.10 0.10
p4 1.40 75.57 8.78 77.54 8.05 0.10 0.11
p5 0.85 84.37 13.72 86.56 14.04 0.10 0.11
p6 0.80 85.21 87.48 98.58 90.39 0.11 1.04
p7 11.70 9.63 12.89 10.99 1.50 0.11 0.10
p8 0.60 88.69 5.81 89.40 6.25 0.10 0.11
p9 0.74 86.24 12.66 88.06 13.24 0.10 0.11
p10 0.78 85.55 8.11 86.77 8.42 0.10 0.11
In Table 4.10 pumps are sorted according to their reliability importance measures. Re-
mark that pump 6 is the most critical according to all RIMs. It is also interesting to high-
light that some RIMs give a similar pump criticality order: CIF and RRW are equivalent,
and MIF provides a close result.
This a priori knowledge can be used to decide how to distribute the control efforts through
the control algorithm. A dynamical RIM analysis will be presented in Section 6.3.5.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, the system reliability computation from the reliability of its components
or subsystems has been presented. Basically, this can be done by using the system config-
uration structure, i.e. serial and parallel systems, and its corresponding expression or in
the case of complex system configurations by using the pivotal decomposition method.
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TABLE 4.10: A priori classification of the pumps
λi Ri IB IDIF ICIF IRAW IRRW
p7 p8 p6 p6 p6 p6 p6
p2 p9 p5 p8 p5 p7 p5
p3 p10 p7 p9 p9 p1 p9
p1 p6 p9 p10 p10 p2 p10
p4 p5 p4 p5 p4 p3 p4
p5 p4 p10 p4 p8 p4 p8
p6 p1 p8 p1 p7 p5 p7
p10 p3 p1 p3 p1 p9 p1
p9 p2 p3 p2 p3 p10 p3
p8 p7 p2 p7 p2 p8 p2
It has also addressed the concepts of MC, BN, and DBN. These concepts have been ap-
plied to model the reliability of a DWN system.
In this chapter, a review of the available RIMs has been performed. These reliability index
measures have been evaluated for a DWN system as a tool to identify the importance of
each pump to the system functioning.
The RIMs have shown to be an objective criterion that can be used to redistribute the con-
trol effort among the available system actuators to avoid, for instance, their degradation.
Chapter 5
Control System
This chapter addresses the concepts involved in control systems and presents
the control approaches used in this thesis. Those control methodologies in-
clude the Model Predictive Control (MPC) and the Linear-Quadratic Regula-
tor (LQR), which can be used to implement a Health-Aware Control scheme
as it will be demonstrated later.
5.1 Model Predictive Control
Model Predictive Control (MPC) was developed in the 70’s and has evolved considerably
providing a wide range of control methods that have in common the use of an explicit
model of the process to calculate the future control input by the minimization of an ob-
jective function. These controller design methods lead to schemes which basically have
the following ideas [18]:
• The use of an explicit model to predict the process output at future time instants
(prediction horizon).
• The computation of a control sequence that involves the minimization of an objec-
tive function.
• A receding strategy which slides the prediction horizon towards the future at each
time instant, and the application at each step of the first element of the computed
control sequence.
This control method has the following advantages:
• It involves very intuitive concepts which make it relatively easy to implement and
tune.
• It can be used to control a wide variety of processes, from those with simple dy-
namics to those with long delay times or nonminimum phase or unstable.
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• It can be extended to the multivariable case.
• It naturally introduces the feed forward action to compensate measurable distur-
bances.
• Constraints can be considered in the design process.
• It is an open methodology which allows future extensions.
As any other control approach, it also has its drawbacks. One of these is the large compu-
tation time needed for its implementation in systems with fast dynamics where real-time
operation is required. Computational time increases, even more, when constraints are
considered. In a system with simple dynamics or high sampling time, this is not a prob-
lem [18].
Moreover, the weakest point in this control method is the need of a suitable model of the
process. In the design algorithm, a prior knowledge of the model is fundamental, and
the results are affected by the discrepancies between the real process and its model.
5.1.1 MPC strategy
Model-based predictive control (MPC) is a discrete-time technique where an explicit dy-
namic model of the plant is considered to predict the system outputs over a finite pre-
diction horizon (Hp), while control actions are manipulated throughout a finite control
horizon (Hc) in order to minimize a given cost function, with Hc < Hp.
This strategy is implemented using the scheme shown in Figure 5.1, where the predicted
future system outputs are computed using a model of the system and the proposed opti-
mal future control actions. The control actions are computed by optimizing a given cost
function and its constraints.
FIGURE 5.1: Basic structure of a Model Predictive Control
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In order to explain the MPC technique, consider the following discrete-time linear dy-
namic model of a system described in the state-space form as:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k)
y(k) = Cx(k)
(5.1)
where for each k ∈ Z+, x(k) ∈ Rn is the state, u(k) ∈ Rp is the control input, y(k) ∈ Rq
is the measured output, A ∈ Rn×n is the state matrix, B ∈ Rq×p is the input matrix and
C ∈ Rq×n is the output matrix.
A prediction model is obtained by applying (5.1) recursively along the prediction hori-
zon, obtaining (5.2), where u(k + j|k) is the predicted control input and ŷ(k + j|k) is the
predicted output, corresponding to k + j computed at time instant k. If control inputs
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The control input values are obtained by the minimization of a cost function. The result-
ing first control action û(k|k) is injected to the system while û(k + i|k) ∀ i = 1, ...,Hc − 1
are discarded. At next time instant k + 1, y(k + 1) is measured and the optimization
problem is solved again. Thus, û(k+ 1|k+ 1) is calculated moving the prediction horizon
forward, following the sliding window concept [18]. This methodology is represented in
Figure 5.2, where the past outputs and control input sequences (shown in the left side) are
used to compute the future output sequence overHp and future control inputs sequences
over Hc, such that the cost function is minimized.
The cost function generally includes a term for the tracking error and the control actions,
among others. For instance, the optimization problem (5.3) aims at minimizing the square
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FIGURE 5.2: Model Predictive Control basic concept.
of the tracking error, and the square of the energy and its increments.
minimize
(û(k|k), ...,




















subject to u ≤ û(k + j|k) ≤ u j = 0, ..,Hc − 1
y ≤ ŷ(k + i|k) ≤ y i = 1, ..,Hp
(5.4)
where yref,i is the ith output reference, αi is the weight for the tracking error, ρi is the
weight for the energy, δi is the weight for the energy variations, and u, u, y and y, are the
lower and upper bounds of the control effort and system outputs, respectively.
Such optimization problem can be casted as the Quadratic Programing (QP) problem






s.t. Ar∆Û ≤ br
BrŶ ≤ cr
lb ≤ Ŷ ≤ ub,
(5.5)
where:
H = 2(δ̃ + [T IpHc]
TΩT α̃Ω[T IpHc] + [T
Ip
Hc]
T ρ̃[T IpHc]) (5.6)
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b =2
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[Ip]Hcu− [Ip]Hcu(k − 1)











[In]Hpy −Θx(k)− Ω[Ip]Hcu(k − 1)
−[In]Hpy + Θx(k) + Ω[Ip]Hcu(k − 1)
]
, (5.11)
and [In]Hp is block column matrix composed by Hp × 1 blocks of identity matrices of
n×n; and T IpHc is a block lower triangular matrix composed by Hc×Hc blocks of identity
matrices of p × p, and α̃ is a block diagonal matrix composed by Hp blocks of matrix
α =diag(α1, α1, ..., αq), and ρ̃ and δ̃ are block diagonal matrices composed by Hc blocks
of matrices ρ =diag(ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρp) and δ =diag(δi, δ2, ..., δp), respectively.













[αi |ûi(k + j − 1|k)|+ ρi |∆ûi(k + j − 1|k)|] ,
(5.12)
where µi, αi, and ρi are weighting factors for the tracking error, the control input and the
control input increments, respectively.
Let λ ∈ Rq, θ ∈ Rp, φ ∈ Rp and η ∈ R [18] be such that
−λi(k + j) ≤ ŷi(k + j|k)− ri(k + j) ≤ λi(k + j) ∀ i = 1, · · · , q and j = 1, · · · , Hp
−θi(k + j) ≤ ûi(k + j − 1|k) ≤ θi(k + j) ∀ i = 1, · · · , p and j = 1, · · · , Hc

















ρiφi(k + j) ≤ η(k). (5.14)
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So, η(k) is an upper bound for the cost function J and the optimization problem now





−Λ(k) ≤ Θx(k)ΩT IpHc∆Û(k) + Ω[Ip]Hcu(k − 1)− Yref ≤ Λ(k)
−Θ(k) ≤ T IpHc∆Û(k) + [Ip]Hcu(k − 1) ≤ Θ(k)
−Φ(k) ≤ ∆Û(k) ≤ Φ(k)
0 ≤ [µ]THpΛ(k) + [ρ]
T
Hp
Θ(k) + [α]THcΦ(k) ≤ η(k)
(5.16)

























The inequalities in (5.16) can be rewritten as:
ΩT IpHc∆Û(k)− Λ(k) ≤ −Θx(k)− Ω[Ip]Hcu(k − 1) + Yref
(5.20)




−Θ(k) ≤ −[Ip]Hcu(k − 1) (5.22)
−T IpHc −Θ(k) ≤ [Ip]Hcu(k − 1) (5.23)
∆Û(k)− Φ(k) ≤ 0pHc (5.24)








Θ(k)− [α]T IpHcΦ(k) ≤ 0 (5.27)
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5.2 Linear-Quadratic Regulator
The Linear-Quadratic Regulator (LQR) is a well known control design technique that
provides feedback gains in a practical manner [114].
Consider the discrete-time, linear time-invariant (LTI) system given in (5.1), and given a







xT (k)QLQRx(k) + uT (k)RLQRu(k)
)
(5.34)
where QLRQ ∈ Rnx×nx and RLRQ ∈ Rnu×nu are Hermitian positive-definite matrices. If
the system is controllable and observable, a feedback control law can be defined as:
u(k) = −Kx(k) (5.35)






The positive-definite symmetric matrix P is the solution of the discrete-time algebraic
Riccati equation:
P = QLQR +ATPA−ATPB(RLQR +BTPB)−1BTPA. (5.37)
The aim of the cost function in this thesis is to use matrix RLQR as a weighting matrix for
the control effort and to redistribute the control input over the available actuators based
on their reliability information, while matrixQLQR is used to weight the system states for
trajectory tracking.
5.3 Conclusions
This chapter presented the control methodologies used in the development of the thesis.
In the case of MPC methodology, the optimization problem has been formulated using
both, a common quadratic and linear cost functions which include terms for minimize
the control action and its variations, and depending the control problem it can include a
term for the minimization of the tracking error.
At the first glance, both, MPC and LQR are optimal control techniques, but they differ
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from the fact that MPC solves the optimization problem in a finite time horizon and
uses the receding horizon approach, while LQR solves an optimization problem over
an infinity time horizon. An important feature of MPC is the possibility of explicitly
including input and state constraints in the control law.
In the MPC technique, its weights play an important role in solving the problem. The
tune of these parameters can lead to aggressive control responses when the ratio be-
tween tracking error and control effort weights is larger. Also, larger horizon prediction
produces a more “optimal” controller but increases it complexity.
Nevertheless, the control effort weights of both, MPC and LQR, can be selected in order
to assign more or less relative importance to each actuator producing lower or higher
relative actuator use. This fact can be used to assign weights according to actuators reli-
abilities or RIMs and in this manner achieve better levels of system reliability.
An open issue that requires further research is the procedure to obtain a cost function
that can include other terms for their minimization but maintain its simplicity. However,
it can lead to a nonlinear or non-convex optimization process whose solution is compu-






This chapter presents the integration of reliability (as a measure of the
health of the system or its components) in the control objectives in order
to avoid the occurrence of catastrophic and incipient faults. Reliability
analysis and failures concern the actuators of the system. This inte-
gration is formulated using the reliability importance measures in the
parameters of the optimization function. The sensitivity of the system
reliability to the degradation of its actuators due to their working load
produced by the control action is key to redistribute the control efforts.
MPC and LQR techniques are investigated to implement such HAC ap-
proach. MPC will be applied to a DWN, and to a multirotot UAV. More-
over, an approach to reduce the degradation of system components is
applied to a Twin Rotor system using MPC.
6.1 Reliability assessment for HAC
Definition 3.1 and (3.9), the reliability of the ith component of the system will be modeled
using the exponential function as:
Ri(t) = e−
∫ t
0 λi(v)dv ∀ i = 1, . . . , p,
where λi(t) is the failure rate depending on time.
In this thesis, the overall system reliability will be computed from the reliability of its
components using the Bayesian networks (see Section 4.2). Moreover, it is assumed that
the overall system reliability is computed by the reliability of its actuators since they
are key in achieving the system controllability. Nevertheless, this methodology could
be extended to other components of the system. For instance, in a DWN, the reliability
of the pipelines could be modeled as a function of the water flow and pressure [5, 80]
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and include it into the overall system reliability computation, or the reliability of the
reservoirs could be modeled as a function of their operational time and the volume of
water they store.
In any case, to achieve the goal of boosting system reliability, reliability computation
should depend on controlled variables, such as voltage, current, flow, pressure, etc.
6.1.1 Failure rate
The failure rate of the actuator varies with time and the actuator usage. The failure rate
in the useful life period of the actuator is assumed to depend on the impact of the load
(usage) and its age.
In this thesis, and adaptation of the PrHM, proposed by Cox [30], and defined as (3.25) is
used:
λi(t) = λ0i · g(u) ∀ i = 1, . . . , p, (6.1)
where λ0i is the baseline failure rate (nominal failure rate) for the ith actuator, and g(u)
represents the effect of the covariates depending on the applied load u. In here, is it
assumed that the parameter λ0i is equivalent to a constant h0, and g(u) is equivalent to
ψ(γz), given in (3.25).
Different definitions of function g(u) exists in the literature. However, the exponential
form is the most commonly used. In [74, 75] the authors propose a load function based
on the root-mean-square of the applied control input (ui) up to the end of the mission
(TM ), and an actuator parameter defined from the upper and lower bounds of control
input.
In Guenab [57] a load function is proposed as:
gi(u) = eα u
prom
i ∀ i = 1, ..., p, (6.2)
where upromi is the average level of the applied control.
In [55], the covariate function is defined as:
gi(u) = eβi||ui,o:k||
2
2 ∀ i = 1, ..., p, (6.3)
where βi = (tM (ui,max − ui,min))−1 is a shape parameter of the actuator failure for an
expected life tM .
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i (t)dt ∀ i = 1, ..., p, (6.4)
where the load function is defined according to the root-mean-square of the applied con-
trol input until the end of the mission (tM ), and βi is an actuator parameter defined as:
βi = (tM (ūi − ui))−1, and ūi and ui are the upper and lower saturation bound of ui,
respectively.
Another expression proposed in [75] is defined as:
gi(u) = eα u
i
nom ∀ i = 1, ..., p, (6.5)
where α is a fixed factor depending on the actuator property, uinom is the nominal control
law delivered by the ith actuator to achieve the control objective.
In this thesis, different definitions of the covariate function have been studied. Initially, in
[143, 144, 146], the covariate function used represents the amount of load on the actuator




∀ i = 1, ..., p, (6.6)
where ui(k) is the control effort at time k, ui and ui are the minimum and maximum con-
trol efforts allowed for the ith actuator. In this case, the highest actuator load corresponds
to ui(k) = ui, which leads to the highest failure rate λi = λ0i .
Expression (6.6) takes into account the impact of the load at each time instant but not the
previous time. In order to include the historical use, equivalent to the age of the actuator,
the following covariate function was proposed in [139, 141]:
gi(u(t)) = 1 + βi
∫ t
0
|ui(v)|dv ∀ i = 1, . . . , p, (6.7)
where gi(ui(t)) is defined as the cumulative applied control effort of the ith actuator from
the beginning of the mission up to time instant tf and βi is a constant parameter.








∀ i = 1, . . . , p (6.8)
this definition implies that actuators are under a constant reliability decay due to the
baseline failure rate which is increased when the actuators are used.
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Expressions (6.6) to (6.3) only take into account the asset load as a factor in the covari-
ate, whereas the definition (6.8) represents a more realistic situation because it takes into
account not only the load of the asset but also the aging produced by the pass of the time.
6.2 Health-Aware Control approaches
In the proposed HAC approach, the controller is enriched with system health informa-
tion provided by a monitoring module and, an accommodation process is performed
to tackled the actuators degradation by adjusting the controller parameters. Figure 6.1
presents a generic block diagram of the proposed approach, where the cost function of
an optimal control strategy is tuned up on the basis of health information provided by
the monitoring module.
FIGURE 6.1: Generic block diagram of the proposed HAC
In the following sections, three approaches to implement the proposed HAC methodol-
ogy will be presented:
1. The first is based on a MPC control and includes information about the compo-
nents and system reliabilities. An MPC controller is set up based on system and
component reliability.
2. An LQR controller is set up based on system and component reliability.
3. An MPC scheme is set up based on actuator usage information.
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To evaluate the benefit of these approaches, some performance indicators will next pro-
posed.
6.2.1 Performance evaluation
Different indexes are proposed to evaluate the performance, in control and reliability
aspects, of the proposed HAC methodologies.
Definition 6.1. The Cumulative Control Effort (Ucum) index indicates the amount of en-





where Ts and TM are the sampling time and the mission time, respectively.
Definition 6.2. The Joint Actuator Reliability (JAR) index measures the remaining overall





And, the Integral Square Error defined as:






(ŷi(k)− yref,i(k))2 . (6.11)
Additionally, the system reliability at the end of the mission time (Rs(TM)) will also be
used as a performance measure.
6.3 MPC framework for system reliability optimization
6.3.1 MPC cost function
As presented in Section 5.1, the MPC algorithm allows including as many objectives as
needed in the cost function. The importance of these objectives in the optimization prob-
lem is handled by the weighting parameters, such as αi(k), ρi(k), and δi(k) (5.4).
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In this scenario, the control objectives study is done by selecting and δi(k) = 1. This
means that the MPC performs a smooth control but this effect is not part of the study,
and that the reference tracking is study by directly assigning the weight ε.
In this section, the optimization problem in (5.4) is reformulated as follows:
Consequently, the cost function used is:
minimize
(û(k|k), ...,






















subject to u ≤ û(k + j|k) ≤ u j = 0, ..,Hc − 1
x ≤ x̂(k + i|k) ≤ x i = 1, ..,Hp
(6.12)
where αi = 1 and δi = 1 for all i.
Note that a trade-off between reference tracking and energy consumption (control ef-
fort) arise. To manage this trade-off, a new weight is added to the formulation problem.
Therefore, parameter ε can be used to find the appropriate equilibrium between both
optimization objectives following the methodology presented later in Section 6.3.2.
6.3.2 MPC tuning methodology
The MPC tuning consists in finding the appropriate values for the weighting parameters
in the cost function.
The values of ρi and ε in (6.12) should be selected as follows:
Step 1:
Set ε = 0 and tune ρi such that the reliability of the system at the end of the mission
time is the highest.
The comparison and selection of the best approach will be performed based on the
JAR criteria (6.10), and the UCum index (6.9).
Step 2:
Tune ε such that the highest system reliability is achieved at mission time Rs(TM )
while ISE index (6.11) is the lowest.
The goal is to study the effect produced by the variation of parameter ε in the sys-
tem reliability or in other words, the impact of the tracking error in the reliability.
Chapter 6. Health-Aware Control 84
Thus, the optimal value for ε which corresponds to the highest system reliability
and the lowest ISE, balancing at the same time both objectives will be found.
6.3.3 Control effort redistribution
In this thesis, two approaches to improve the system reliability are studied. On one hand,
a local approach which focuses on the actuators reliability, and on the other hand, the
global approach which focuses on the overall system reliability.
To implement such approaches, the weight ρi(k) in the cost function (6.12) is used as a
way to redistribute the control efforts among the actuators [144]. The greater the value
given to component ρi is, the higher importance the ith actuator will have and the more
penalization it will have in the optimization problem.
The local approach attempts to preserve the component reliability:
ρi(k) = 1−Ri(k) ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , p. (6.13)
This criteria aims at finding the optimal control actions and distributing them among the
available actuators in such a way that actuators with lower reliability level are relieved.
Hence, the use of highly reliable components is prioritized.
The local approach assumes an equivalent contribution of component reliability to sys-
tem reliability. However, this is hardly ever true because their contribution depends on
the system structure and the interconnection of the actuators within such structure.
The aim of the global approach is to determine the relative importance of the actuators
with the objective of improving the overall system reliability. This study is based on
the study of the RIMs (see Section 4.4), which provide different measures of actuator
importance. For instance, by using the Birnbaum’s measure as follows:
ρi(k) = IB,i(k) ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , p, (6.14)
where IB,i(k) denotes the Birnbaum’s measure of the ith actuator at instant time k. In this
case, it is expected that components with a greater contribution to the system reliability
are used less than the others.
The control strategy scheme is presented in Figure 6.2. The MPC computes the control
inputs according to: the cost function, a set of bounds, the current system state and the
weights ρi. Then, the control input is injected to the system and used to compute the
component failure rates.
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FIGURE 6.2: Block diagram of the approach
Those failure rates are used in the DBN to compute: the components reliability, the over-
all system reliability and the RIMs. This data is used then to update the weights ρi, which
is used in the MPC algorithm.
6.3.4 DWN example
Consider the DWN example 4.3 (see Figure 4.9). The control objective is to supply the
water demand of Figure 4.10 while keeping the volume of the tanks within a minimum
and maximum security levels.
The control of the DWN system is performed applying the MPC formulation according
to Section 6.3 and the cost function given by (6.12). A hierarchical control structure is
assumed, where the MPC layer produces a set of set-points for the lower level flow con-
trollers. It is also assumed the expression (6.6) as the covariates function.
Since the water demand exhibits a daily profile, a 24 hours prediction horizon has been
chosen. The control horizon is set to 8 hours in order to maintain a lower quantity of vari-
ables to be computed in the optimization problem. The initial tank volumes have been
set to X0, and a sampling time of 1 hour is assumed for the upper level MPC. Table 6.1
provides the simulation parameters used. The “?” sign in Table 6.8 refers to the different
configuration according to the RIM values.
Assume the volume references for the tanks presented in Figure 6.3. The correct tracking
of these references guarantees the secure operation of the system, for example avoiding
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TABLE 6.1: Simulation parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Prediction and control hori-
zon
Hp [h] | Hc [h] 24 | 8
Sampling and mission time Ts [h] | TM [h] 1 | 2000
Cost function weights ρi | ε {1, 1−Ri, ?} | {10−18, ..., 1}
Upper control effort bound U [m3/s]
0.75 0.75 0.75 1.20 0.85
1.60 1.70 0.85 1.70 1.60
Lower control effort bound U [m3/s]
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Baseline failure rate λ0 [h−1 · 10−4]
9.85 10.70 10.50 1.40 0.85
0.80 11.70 0.60 0.74 0.78
Upper state bound X [m3] 65200 3100 14450 11745
Lower state bound X [m3] 25000 2200 5200 3500
Initial states X0 [m3] 45100 2650 9825 7622
water shortages in droughts, or in rainstorms avoiding tank overflowing and the subse-
quent floods in rainstorms. Also, it could help when performing maintenance task in the
reservoirs.
FIGURE 6.3: Volume reference for the 4 reservoirs
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6.3.5 MPC tuning
The MPC tuning will follows the procedure proposed in Section 6.3.2. Therefore, the
first step involves setting ε to 0. Then, the cost function will optimize two objectives, the
control effort and its variations.
Previously, in Section 4.5, a RIM static analysis for the DWN system was presented. Now,
a dynamic analysis which involves the computation of the overall system reliability, as
well as the pump RIMs through the DBN in Figure 4.11 will be presented.
Table 6.2 presents the performance indices corresponding to several simple ρi(k) assign-
ments. A nominal case corresponding to the situation where no reliability information is
taken into account in the control loop (i.e., ρi(k) = 1) is also considered.
TABLE 6.2: Simple ρi(k) assignment performance
ρi(k) Rs(TM ) [%] Ucum[·106] JAR
1 97.50 1.537 0.093
1−Ri 97.88 2.025 0.214
IB,i 99.34 3.850 0.170
IDIF,i 97.49 1.538 0.089
ICIF,i 99.39 3.904 0.171
IRAW,i 97.50 1.537 0.093
IRRW,i 97.44 1.556 0.094
In both cases (local and global), improving system reliability leads to an increase in the
cumulative actuator usage which indicates that the improvement of system reliability can
lead to an increase of energy consumption.
According to the system reliability indexes, the best results are obtained with ρi(k) =
ICIF,i(k) and ρi(k) = IB,i(k). These two RIMs provided a close pump criticality ordering
in Table 4.10. ρi(k) = IRRW,i(k) does not provide a good performance, although CIF and
RRW measures were expected to be equivalent according to Table 4.10.
Moreover, the local approach corresponding to ρi(k) = 1 − Ri(k) produces the best re-
maining overall pump reliability but does not provide the best overall system reliabil-
ity. Figure 6.4 shows the difference between the overall system reliability obtained with
ρi(k) = 1 and that obtained with several simple ρi assignments.
Provided the results obtained in the static and dynamic RIM analysis, some combined
ρi(k) assignments will be investigated. In particular, results corresponding to combi-
nations of MIF, CIF and RRW are provided in Table 6.3. The best results correspond to
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FIGURE 6.4: System reliability increment.
ρi(k) = ICIF,i(k)·IRRW,i(k) and ρi(k) = IB,i(k)·IRRW,i(k), improving the results obtained
in the assignment of ρi(k) to a single RIM.
TABLE 6.3: Combined ρi assignment performance
ρi(k) Rs(TM ) [%] Ucum[·106] JAR
ICIF,i(k) · IRRW,i(k) 99.44 3.971 0.172
IB,i(k) · IRRW,i(k) 99.42 3.946 0.172
IB,i(k) · ICIF,i(k) · IRRW,i(k) 98.78 3.518 0.153
IB,i(k) · ICIF,i(k) 98.73 3.463 0.152
Figure 6.5 shows the gain/loss of system reliability in comparison to the nominal sce-
nario, i.e. the difference between the overall system reliability obtained in the nominal
case (ρi(k) = 1) and that obtained with several combined ρi assignments.
Although the reliability is improved, the consumption of energy increases. This could be
due to the fact that the controller tends to use more those pumps whose impact on the
overall system reliability is lower.
According to their definitions, when the combination of CIF and RRW is used, the objec-
tive is to preserve those components whose reliabilities are critical for the system func-
tioning and those that can produce the largest system reliability reduction. In the case of
ρi(k) = ICIFi(k) · IRRWi(k), the objective is to preserve those components whose reliabil-
ity changes would produce the highest variation and the highest reduction in the system
reliability.
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FIGURE 6.5: System reliability increment.
Figure 6.6 illustrates the improvement of system reliability with respect to the nominal
scenario.







FIGURE 6.6: System reliability comparison.
Figure 6.7 shows the tanks volume corresponding to scenario where ρi(k) = 1 and ρi(k) =
ICIF,i(k) · IRRW,i(k). Moreover, note that as the tracking error objective is not taken into
account, the volume references are not achieved, but the tanks volume is between the
minimum and maximum levels.
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FIGURE 6.7: Tanks volume [m3]: blue line corresponds to ρi(k) = 1 and
red line corresponds to ρi(k) = ICIF,i(k) · IRRW,i(k).
Figure 6.8 shows the pump inputs corresponding to the scenario where ρi(k) = 1 and
ρi(k) = ICIF,i(k) · IRRW,i(k). It can be seen that different pump commands are produced
in each approach.
Now, consider the second step of the tuning methodology. This step aims at finding the
appropriate value for parameter ε in the cost function (6.12). Parameter ρi(k) has been
chosen in order to obtain the best system reliability improvement. The selection of ε
follows step 2 of the procedure presented in Section 6.3.2.
Several simulations have been done for some values of ε in the range 0 to 1. Figure 6.9
shows the system reliability obtained at the end of the mission time (TM ), where the over-
all system reliability behavior is, as expected, decreasing as ε approaches to 1. Neverthe-
less, for a value of epsilon near 1, the system reliability exhibits an increasing trend. This
could be due to numerical issues in the optimization solver. Nevertheless, the trade-off
between both objectives is clearly evident.
Figure 6.10 shows the ISE index obtained at the end of the mission. These results show
that as ε approaches to 1, a lower ISE is obtained, as it can be expected from (6.12), since
the tracking error is less penalized.
Therefore according to these results, the optimal tuning for the MPC parameters would
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FIGURE 6.8: Pumping inputs [m3/h]: blue line corresponds to ρi = 1 and
red line corresponds to ρi = ICIF,i · IRRW,i.
be: ρi(k) = ICIF,i(k) · IRRW,i(k), and ε = 3.162 × 10−11 which result in a higher system
reliability and lower ISE. Figure 6.11 presents the reference tracking response of the con-
trol algorithm. Although the system follows the given references for the four tanks, there
is some ripples especially for volume of tank 1. This could be due to the less weight as-
signed to this objective and to the fact that the water demand sector disturbs the volume
of tank 1 to a greater extent than the others.
Chapter 6. Health-Aware Control 92
FIGURE 6.9: Overall system reliability evolution for the 4 reservoirs in
semi-log scale
FIGURE 6.10: Tracking error for the 4 reservoirs in semi-log scale
6.3.6 Application to a DWN with multiple demands
Now, consider the DWN system presented in Figure 6.12 composed by multiple sources
and demand sectors to illustrate the methodology to compute the overall system reliabil-
ity of a more complex example.
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FIGURE 6.11: Tracking references of tanks
As stated in Section 4.3, this thesis and the methodology proposed here are focused only
on the topological reliability.
From the system structure, it is possible to obtain a description of the system which only
takes into account those components which have a reliability degradation process, in this
thesis they are the actuators of the system.
Although, it is possible to make some reductions on the structure of complex systems
by doing series and parallels equivalences, there are some structures that cannot be re-
duced and, in such cases other methods to obtain the overall system reliability expression
should be used, e.g. the pivotal decomposition or the structure function computation
from the minimal path/cut sets methods discussed in Section 4.1.
Moreover, this system has more than one source where water can be taken and more
than one demand sector where water must be supplied. Therefore, the computation of
its overall reliability is different to the system with one water demand sector. In the
following, a methodology to compute it is presented:
Step 1: Assume a network with l demands. Find the hj minimal path sets of each demand
i (mpsjk, corresponding to the kth minimal path sets of the jth demand). This in-
volves all pumps which connect a demand with the sources.
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FIGURE 6.12: DWN with 3 sources and 4 demands sectors.
For instance, the system of Figure 6.12 has 20 minimal path sets distributed as fol-
lows: 9 for demand 1, 4 for demand 2, 5 for demand 3, and 2 for demand 4:
mps11 = {p1, p3, p7} (6.15)
mps12 = {p1, p5, p10} (6.16)
mps13 = {p2, p4, p7} (6.17)
mps14 = {p2, p6, p10} (6.18)
mps15 = {p14, p11, p12} (6.19)
mps16 = {p1, p3, p12, p13} (6.20)
mps17 = {p2, p4, p12, p13} (6.21)
mps18 = {p1, p5, p15, p11, p12} (6.22)
mps19 = {p2, p6, p15, p11, p12} (6.23)
mps21 = {p1, p3, p9} (6.24)
mps22 = {p1, p5, p8} (6.25)
mps23 = {p2, p6, p8} (6.26)
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mps24 = {p2, p4, p9} (6.27)
mps31 = {p14, p11} (6.28)
mps32 = {p1, p3, p13} (6.29)
mps33 = {p2, p4, p13} (6.30)
mps34 = {p1, p5, p15, p13, p11} (6.31)
mps35 = {p2, p6, p15, p13} (6.32)
mps41 = {p1, p5, p16} (6.33)
mps42 = {p2, p6, p16} (6.34)











where Xi is a binary random variable representing the state of the ith component
(as defined in (4.7)).
Step 3: Now, the overall system reliability should be obtained by expanding the structure
function expression (6.35) and then simplify it using the fact thatXαi =Xi and taking
the expectation (and replacing P(Xi = 1) by Ri).
Rs = E[Φ(X)] (6.36)
For the system of this example, the time spent to compute the overall system reliability
was 321.5709 seconds and the reliability expression has 610 terms, which could increase
exponentially as the number of minimal path increases.
Regarding the RIMs needed to apply the methodology proposed in Section 6.2, it is pos-
sible to compute them from the structure function as presented in Section 4.4.
6.4 Health-Aware LQR framework
6.4.1 LQR framework for HAC implementation
As presented in Section 5.2, the LQR algorithm minimizes the cost function (5.34), that
includes two weighting matrices, RLQR and QLQR. The RLQR matrix weights the control
effort magnitude and the QLQR one weights the system states.
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Thus, matrix RLQR can be used to redistribute the control effort between the actuators
based on reliability information. The matrix could be assigned to a combination of RIM
indexes, following a similar study to that in the previous section. However, just the
following assignment will be analyzed:
RLQR(k) = diag(IB(k)), (6.37)
with IB = [IB,1, IB,2, . . . , IB,p].
This methodology is illustrated through an example over an octorotor system. For com-
parison purposes, an additional scenario will be considered, where no actuator reliability
is taken into account in the LQR cost function. In this second scenario RLQR will be set
as RLQR(k) = I (I is the identity matrix of proper dimensions).
6.4.2 Octorotor UAV model
To describe the dynamics of a multirotor, it is necessary to define the two frames in which
it will operate: Inertial frame and Body frame, which are related by the rotation matrix.
The inertial frame {I} is static and represents the reference of the multirotor while the
body frame {B} is defined by the orientation of the multirotor and is situated in its center
of mass (see Figure 6.13).
FIGURE 6.13: Octorotor PPNNPPNN structure.
The dynamics of a multirotor is given by the following equations [99]:
ẋI =vx (6.38)














[cos(φI) cos(θI)]T − g (6.43)
φ̇I =p+ sin(φ) tan(θ)q + cos(φ) tan(θ)r (6.44)








[−(Jzz − Jyy)qr − JpqΩp + τx] (6.47)
q̇ = 1
Jyy
[(Jzz − Jxx)pr + JppΩp + τy] (6.48)
ṙ = 1
Jzz
[−(Jyy − Jxx)pq + τz] (6.49)
where Jp is the inertia moment of the motor (rotating parts) and the propeller around z
axis, T is the lift force, and J = diag(Jxx, Jyy, Jzz) is the inertia tensor of the octorotor
body.
Then, for the octorotor with the structure PPNNPPNN as the one presented in Fig-
ure 6.13, where P and N define a positive and negative reactive motor torque respectively
(represented as arrows), Ωp is:
Ωp = −|Ω1|−|Ω2|+|Ω3|+|Ω4|−|Ω5|−|Ω6|+|Ω7|+|Ω8| (6.50)
where Ωi is the angular velocity of the ith motor.
Four propellers can rotate in a clockwise direction, while the remaining can rotate anti-
clockwise. The octorotor is moved by changing the rotor speeds. For example, increasing
or decreasing together the eight propellers speeds, vertical motion is achieved. Changing
only the speeds of the propellers situated oppositely produces either roll or pitch rota-
tion, coupled with the corresponding lateral motion. Finally, yaw rotation results from
the difference in the counter-torque between each pair of propellers. Moreover, the oc-
torotor has actuator redundancy and can function with at least four propellers forming a
quadrotor structure.
Notice that the arrows in Figure 6.13 represent the reactive torque of the motors. Further-
more, the system inputs Ωi produce a lift force T and torques τ in x, y, and z axis given
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by:
uv = BstruΩ (6.51)
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where kb and kd are coefficients of the motor and l is the distance between the center of
mass and the center of the rotor. The parameters value which define the octorotor model
are presented in Table 6.4.
TABLE 6.4: Parameters value
Parameter Symbol Value
Body inertia Jxx = Jyy 25 · 10−3 [kgm2]
Body inertia Jzz 42 · 10−3 [kgm2]
Propeller inertia Jp 104 · 10−6 [kgm2]
Mass m 1.86 [kg]
Arm length l 0.4 [m]
Thrust factor kb 54.2 · 10−6 [Ns2]
Drag factor kd 1.1 · 10−6 [Nms2]
Equations (6.38)-(6.49) define the nonlinear state space model of an octorotor that should
be linearized to apply a health aware linear-quadratic controller (LQR) for the UAV sys-
tem.
The state and inputs vectors considered are x = [x y z φ θ ψ vx vy vz p q r]T and
u = [Ω21 Ω22 Ω23 Ω24 Ω25 Ω26 Ω27 Ω28 ]T , respectively, the Taylor series approximation at the
hover position is applied.
The hover position corresponds to the situation where the planes xy of both frames ({I}
and {B}) are in parallel and the motors are generating a lifting force equal to the weight
of the octorotor.
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6.4.3 Octorotor LQR controller
In this example, the control of the UAV consists in a cascade structure (see Figure 6.14),
where the outer loop controls the pose of the UAV in axis x and y and the inner loop
controls the pose in axis z and the orientation in axis x, y and z. Note that the inner loop
frequency is faster than the outer loop one.
FIGURE 6.14: Control scheme.
Therefore, the linear model will be divided into two subsystems. On one hand, the inner
control loop, where eI is the inner state vector denoted as:
eI = xrefi − xi
= [ez eφ eθ eψ evz ep eq er]
T ,
(6.53)
and ∆uI is the inner input vector denoted as:
∆uI =
[
∆Ω21 ∆Ω22 ∆Ω23 ∆Ω24 ∆Ω25 ∆Ω26 ∆Ω27 ∆Ω28
]T
, (6.54)
with ∆Ω2i = Ω2i − uff = Ω2i − mg/(8kb), where uff stands for the input providing the
equilibrium point.
Therefore, the inner loop model is given by:















with βI = diag(1/m, 1/Jxx, 1/Jyy, 1/Jzz) is a diagonal matrix, I4×4 is the identity matrix
andBstr is the structural matrix (6.52).
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On the other hand, the outer control loop, where eo is the outer state vector denoted as:
eo = xrefo − xo
=
[




and ∆uo is the outer input vector denoted as:
∆uo = [∆φ ∆θ]T
= [φref θref ]T .
(6.57)
Therefore, the outer loop model is:
















with g is the gravitational acceleration equal to 9.81 [m/s2].
Regarding the HAC LQR-based, Figure 6.15 presents its scheme, where a module to com-
pute the actuators and system reliabilities is attached to the inner control loop and is used
to adapt the parameters of the controller, i.e. the RLQR matrix of the inner loop.
6.4.4 Octorotor reliability model
In this application, the covariate is expressed as a function of the load and the age of the
actuator. Therefore, the covariate function and the failure rate used are (6.7) and (6.8),
respectively.
Regarding the overall system reliability, it is computed using the system structure func-
tion as presented in Section 4.1. It is assumed that the overall system reliability is deter-
mined by the reliability of its actuators and the system controllability.
Although the octorotor system has 8 actuators (ri ∀ i ∈ [1, 8]) in terms of controllability,
it can flight without any problem with at least 4 of them. In such scenario the system
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FIGURE 6.15: HAC LQR-based.
becomes a quadrotor. Among all 4-rotor configurations, the following minimal path sets
which guarantee controllability can be found:
ζ1 :{r1, r3, r5, r7} (6.59)
ζ2 :{r2, r4, r6, r8} (6.60)
ζ3 :{r2, r3, r6, r7} (6.61)
ζ4 :{r1, r4, r5, r8}. (6.62)
A graphic representation of these minimal path sets is shown in Figure 6.16.
Figure 6.17 presents the reliability block diagram based on the minimal path sets (ζi)
where Ri is the ith rotor reliability.
Then the system reliability can be computed using the pivotal decomposition method
(Section 4.1). Therefore, the overall system reliability is given by:
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FIGURE 6.16: Minimal path sets of the octorotor system.
FIGURE 6.17: Reliability block diagram.
6.4.5 Simulation Results
A simulated corn field aerial supervision application has been considered. The UAV
mission involves flying over a corn field of 5000m2 at an altitude of 5m departing from
the ground and following a grid path trajectory, as presented in Figure 6.18. A nonlinear
model of the UAV has been used as simulator, contrary to the linear one used to design
the controller.
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FIGURE 6.18: UAV reference trajectory.
The obtained linear model is as follows:
A =

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 9.81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −9.81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0






0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0.5376 0 0 0
0 39.3701 0 0
0 0 39.3701 0





C = I[12×12]. (6.66)
The simulation parameters are presented in Table 6.5.
The tracking results of the LQR controller for the first 200 seconds in the scenario are pre-
sented in Figure 6.19, where RLQR(k) = diag(IB(k)), that aims at preserving the critical
rotors which cause a larger impact on the system reliability. The tracking performance
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TABLE 6.5: Simulation parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Outer sampling time tsi 0.05 [s]
Inner sampling time tso 0.25 [s]
Mission time TM 2000 [s]
Rotor parameter βi 10−2 ∀ i ∈ [1, 8]
Rotors baseline failure rate λ0i {21, 25, 2, 5, 16, 29, 9, 8} ·10−6 [s−1]
Rotor upper bounds ui 7 ∀ i ∈ [1, 8] [N ]
Rotor lower bounds ui 0 ∀ i ∈ [1, 8] [N ]
Initial states x(0) 0[12×1] [m]
Feed-Forward input uff mg/8[8×1] [rad/s]
Weighting matrix Q outer loop Qout I[6×6] × 10−4
Weighting matrix R outer loop Roit I[2×2]
Weighting matrix Q inner loop QLQR
diag([0.01, 10, 10, 0.1, 0.0001,
0.01, 0.01, 0.010, 0.01, 0.010])
Weighting matrix R inner loop RLQR(k) I and IB(k)
corresponding to RLQR = I is not explicitly shown, since it nearly corresponds to Fig-
ure 6.19.
Figure 6.20 presents the control efforts (angular velocities) in the scenarios where the
Birnbaum’s measure is used (RLQR(k) = diag(IB(k))) and RLQR(k) = I (i.e. ΩIBi , and
ΩIi ).
The overall system reliability enhancement is achieved by relieving the control efforts
of those rotors which are mostly critical to the system. According to Figure 6.20, this
corresponds to rotors r1, r2, r5 and r6, which have a higher failure rate according to
Table 6.5, and are present in all the minimal path sets (see Figure 6.17).
Figure 6.21 provides a comparison between the system reliability obtained with assign-
ment RLQR(k) = I denoted as RIS(k) and the one obtained with assignment RLQR(k) =
diag(IB) denoted as RIBS (k), after having performed several missions. Under RLQR(k) =
diag(IB(k)), the safety of the system is increased by allowing its operation until the end
of the mission with a higher reliability level.
Results of the indexes for scenarios RLQR(k) = I and RLQR(k) = diag(IB), Ucum, JAR,
and ISE, introduced in Section 6.2.1, are summarized in Table 6.6. Similar results are
achieved in both cases. Remark however, that in this scenario the cumulative actuator
usage and the tracking error are both smaller when using the Birnbaum’s measure.
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FIGURE 6.19: System states response with R(k) =diag(IB(k)).
TABLE 6.6: Performance indexes.
RLQR(k) Rs(TM ) [·10−3] Ucum[·106] JAR ISE [·103]
I 235.9971 673.3721 3.0706 70.1401
IB(k) 235.9985 673.3712 3.0706 70.1229
6.5 Actuators usage management in the control loop
6.5.1 Actuator usage
On Section 6.2 and Section 6.3 the actuators usage was managed based on its impact on
the overall system reliability.
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FIGURE 6.20: Angular velocities ΩIBi and ΩIi .
Now, a model of the degradation of the actuators is used to determine the control ef-
forts. This will be achieved in by formulating an MPC algorithm under actuator usage
constraints [124].
Anticipating component faults is crucial to guarantee the process safe operation. Among
all components, actuators are the most critical, since they are responsible of governing
the process performance through control loops. However, due to their continuing use
they are subject to stress and wear. Actually the control law could mitigate actuator
degradation by deciding the proper control effort to be delivered. Thus, accounting for
these degradation processes in the control law would be desirable, such that actuator
faults could be prevented before next maintenance service was scheduled.
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FIGURE 6.21: Difference between system reliabilities RIBS and R
I
S .
Assuming that the actuator wear is proportional to the exerted control effort u, a model
for the cumulative degradation z(k) ∈ Rp can be written as:
z(k + 1) = z(k) + Γ|u(k)|, (6.67)
where Γ = diag(γ1, γ2, . . . , γp) is a diagonal matrix of degradation coefficients associated
with the p elements of z(k). These coefficients are assumed to be constant and calibrated
through experimental data and they may be related to measurable variables such as vi-
bration, internal electrical resistance, or temperature, which are assumed to be known.
Assume that a maintenance service is scheduled at sample k = kM . The goal consists in
guaranteeing that the cumulative degradation remains below a safe threshold zth during
the maintenance horizon,
z(k) ≤ zth, ∀ k ∈ [0, kM ]. (6.68)
6.5.2 MPC formulation under actuator usage constraints
A cumulative degradation model which assumes that the degradation of the actuators
is proportional to the exerted control effort u and its variations ∆u is proposed in [124,
125]. In such an approach, Pereira, Galvao, et al. [124] propose to manage the actuators
degradation through the control action, imposing a threshold in the cumulative degra-
dation of the actuators, and adapting the used actuator to this threshold, by introducing
the degradation as a constraint in the cost function. In this case, the system performance
is not affected because of the redundancy of the actuators in the system. If an actuator
reaches its maxim degradation, its usage is reduced and compensated by the redundant
actuator.
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The actuators degradation model will be integrated in the cost function (5.12) which min-
imizes the tracking error, the control increments, and the magnitude of the control input.
Constraint (6.68) should be included in the optimization problem. However, this would
require extending the prediction horizon over the maintenance horizon, becoming an
intractable problem. Instead the following constraint will be considered:
z(k +Hp) ≤ zmax(k) (6.69)
To determine zmax the uniform "rationing" heuristic proposed in [124] will be followed.
This heuristic states that the degradation over a prediction horizon of length Hp < kM is
allowed to increase by
Hp
zth − z(k)
kM +Hp − k
(6.70)
Therefore, the maximum degradation at the end of prediction horizon must not exceed:
zmax(k) = z(k) +Hp
zth − z(k)
kM +Hp − k
(6.71)
From (6.67), a prediction equation for the degradation index can be written as




Γ 0p×p · · · 0p×p










0p×p 0p×p · · · (Hp −Hc + 1)Γ

(6.73)
Thus, using equations (6.72) and (5.18), the constraint (6.69) can be replaced with
z(k) + ΞΘ ≤ zmax (6.74)
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The idea to include actuators usage constraints in the optimization problem was already
presented in [124]. The contribution in this thesis consists in analyzing the role of the cost
function weights in improving the system safety. Next, this methodology will be applied
to a Twin Rotor MIMO system.
6.5.3 Twin Rotor MIMO system
The Twin-Rotor MIMO System (TRMS) is a laboratory setup (Figure 6.22) developed by
Feedback Instruments Limited for control experiments. The system is perceived as a
challenging engineering problem due to its high non-linearity, cross-coupling between
its two axes, and inaccessibility of some of its states measures.
FIGURE 6.22: Components of the Twin Rotor MIMO System
The TRMS mechanical unit has two rotors (the main and the tail, both driven by DC
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motors) placed on a beam together with a counterbalance whose arm with a weight at its
end is fixed to the beam at the pivot and it determines a stable equilibrium position. The
beam can rotate freely both in the horizontal and vertical planes.
This application aims at showing the effect of the degradation on the system performance
through the controller. This is part of the first results obtained in the research on this
thesis.
Accurate models for TRMS are proposed by [27, 46, 130] and [135]. Each of these models
lead to a set of nonlinear differential equations where the TRMS is split into simpler
subsystems: the DC-Motors, the propellers and the beam. The first two have independent
dynamics, that is, the main motor does not affect the behavior of the tail motor, and
vice versa. The same is true for the propellers. On the other hand, the dynamics of
the beam are strongly nonlinear with the presence of interaction phenomenon among
the horizontal and the vertical dynamics. The state of the beam is described by four
process variables: horizontal and vertical angles measured by position sensors fitted at
the pivot, and their two corresponding angular velocities. The tacho-generators are used
to measure the angular velocities of the rotors.
The constants of the nonlinear model are presented in Table 6.7.
Parameter Symbol Value
Aerodynamic force coeff. of the tail rotor for positive
ωh
kfhp 1.84 · 10−6[N/rpm2]
Aerodynamic force coeff. of the tail rotor for negative
ωh
kfhn 2.2 · 10−6[N/rpm2]
Aerodynamic force coeff. of the main rotor for posi-
tive ωv
kfvp 1.62 · 10−5[N/rpm2]
Aerodynamic force coeff. of the main rotor for nega-
tive ωv
kfvn 1.08 · 10−5[N/rpm2]
Angular velocity of the TRMS around the vertical
axis
Ωh [rpm]
Angular velocity of the TRMS around the horizontal
axis
Ωv [rpm]
Armature inductance of tail / main motor Lah/av 0.86× 10−3[H]
Armature resistance of tail / main motor Rah/av 8[Ω]
Cable force coefficient for negative θh kchn kchp ∗ 0.9
Cable force coefficient for positive θv kchp 8.54 · 10−3
Horizontal friction coefficient of the beam subsystem koh 4.7 · 10−3
Vertical friction coefficient of the beam subsystem kov 1.31 · 10−3
Distance between the counterweight and the joint lcb 0.276[m]
Drag friction coefficient of the tail propeller kth 5 · 10−8
Drag friction coefficient ktv 5.6 · 10−7
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Equilibrium pitch angle (uv = 0.2753V ) θ0v 0[◦]
Gyroscopic constant kg 0.2
Input constant of the main motor k2 8.5
Input voltage of the tail motor uh [V ]
Input voltage of the main motor uv [V ]
Input constant of the tail motor k1 6.5
Length of tail part of the beam lt 0.282[m]
Length of main part of the beam lm 0.246[m]
Length of counter-weight beam lb 0.290[m]
Mass of the counter-weight mcb 0.068[kg]
Mass of the counter-weight beam mb 0.022[kg]
Mass of main part of the beam mm 0.014[kg]
Mass of the tail shield mts 0.119[kg]
Mass of the main DC motor mmr 0.236[kg]
Mass of the tail DC motor mtr 0.221[kg]
Moment of inertia main DC motor Jmr 2.16 · 10−4[kgm2]
Moment of inertia in tail motor Jtr 3.14 · 10−5[kgm2]
Positive constant kt 2.6 · 10−5
Mass of the main shield mms 0.219[kg]
Mass of the tail part of the beam mt 0.015[kg]
Pitch angle of the beam θv [◦]
Physical constant kah/vϕh/v 0.0202[Nm/A]
Positive constant km 2 · 10−4
Radius of the tail shield rts 0.1[m]
Radius of the main shield rms 0.155[m]
Rotational velocity of the tail rotor ωh [rpm]
Rotational velocity of the main rotor ωv [rpm]
Viscous friction coefficient of the tail propeller Btr 2.3 · 10−5[kg.m2/s]
Viscous friction coefficient of the main propeller Bmr 4.5 · 10−5[kg.m2/s]
Yaw angle of the beam θh [◦]




























= ltf2(ωh) cos θv − kohΩh − f3(θh)
D cos2 θv + E sin2 θv + F
+ kmωv sin θvΩv
(
D cos2 θv − E sin2 θv − F − 2E cos2 θv
)(
D cos2 θv + E sin2 θv + F
)2
Chapter 6. Health-Aware Control 112
+ km cos θv (kavϕviav −Bmrωv − f4(ωv))(









= lmf5(ωv) + kgΩhf5(ωv) cos θv − kovΩv
Jv
+ g ((A−B) cos θv − C sin θv)− 0.5Ωh
2H sin 2θv
Jv






where uh/v is the input voltage of the tail/main motor, Ωh/v is the angular velocity around
the vertical/horizontal axis, θh/v is the azimuth/pitch beam angle (horizontal/vertical
plane), ωh/v is the rotational velocity of the tail/main rotor, Jtr/mr is the moment of in-
ertia in DC-motor tail/main propeller subsystem, kah/vϕh/v is the torque constant of the
tail/main motor, and Jv is the moment of inertia about the horizontal axis. Functions fi
are defined as:





h if ωh ≥ 0




kchpθh if θh ≥ 0
kchnθh if θh < 0
(6.86)





v if ωv ≥ 0
−kfvnω2v if ωv < 0
(6.88)

















D = mb3 l
2
















wheremms andmts are the masses of the main and tail shields,mm andmt are the masses
of the main and the tail parts of the beam, mmr and mtr are the masses of the main and
the tail DC-motor with main and tail rotor, mb and lb are the mass and the length of
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the counter-weight beam, mcb and lcb represent the mass of the counter-weight and the
distance between the counter-weight and the joint, and rms and rts are the radius of the
main and tail shield.
6.5.4 MPC of TRMS system
Using the nonlinear model of the TRMS (6.78)-(6.83) a linear model has been obtained by
linearizing around an equilibrium point (ūh = 0.9865, ūv = 0.2753, θ̄h = 1.5700, θ̄v = 0)
and discretizing with a sample time Ts = 0.015 s:
A =

1.0 0.015 4.1e− 7 2.8e− 8 2.3e− 5 −6.5e− 6 −1.9e− 7 9.1e− 9
−2.8e− 3 1.0 5.4e− 5 3.7e− 6 3.1e− 3 −8.5e− 4 −2.5e− 5 4.9e− 7
0 0 0.96 0.066 0 0 0 0
0 0 −2.4e− 3 −1.7e− 4 0 0 0 0
−1.2e− 8 1.3e− 5 −7.6e− 8 5.1e− 9 1.0 0.015 8.2e− 7 8.1e− 9
−2.5e− 6 1.8e− 3 −1.0e− 5 5.4e− 9 −0.075 1.0 1.1e− 4 1.1e− 6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99 0.01






1.0e− 6 7.2e− 7
2.1e− 4 9.0e− 5
7.6 0
0.79 0
3.9e− 7 4.0e− 7








1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
]
(6.91)
The system input vector is u = [uh uv]T and the system states are x = [θh Ωh ωh iah θv Ωv
ωv iav]T . The control objective consists in maintaining the pitch angle θv and the azimuth
angle θh in the desired angular positions under decoupling and actuator degradation
effects. For the azimuth angle, a square reference signal has been defined, whereas the
pitch angle reference signal has been set to 0◦. As not all state variables are measured, a
reduced-order state observer is used to estimate nonmeasured variables, which are the
angular momentums of the beams and the armature currents of the rotors (Ωh, Ωv, iav,
iah).
Regarding the HAC for the TRMS, Figure 6.23 presents the control scheme of the ap-
proach. Here, an MPC cost function is tuned based on the degradation coefficient of the
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actuators. Additionally, the data provided by a monitoring module is used to changes
the constrains in the optimization problem. This module monitors system control inputs
and compute the degradation of the actuators according to their use.
FIGURE 6.23: HAC MPC-based for TRMS.
Since actuator degradation depends on the time evolution of u, the design of a health-
aware MPC law can be taken into account through two approaches: the inclusion of
the degradation constraint (6.69) and the proper tuning of the weighting factors ρ and
α. To study this dependency, 4 case studies are simulated using the nonlinear model of
the TRMS. The general MPC parameters are summarized in Table 6.8, and the specific
parameters corresponding to each case are shown in Table 6.9. In both tables, subindex
1 (2) corresponds to input uh (uv), except for parameter µ which is related to θh (θv).
HM is the maintenance interval, and is related to the maintenance horizon as follows:
HM = kMTs.
Simulation results are shown in Figures 6.24-6.27, for azimuth angle θh and pitch angle
θv. Cumulative degradation z is shown in Figure 6.28(a) for tail and Figure 6.28(b) for
main motor.
In Table 6.10 some performance indexes have been evaluated for a simulation interval
of 1 hour (Tsim). Rows 2 and 3 indicate the integral of the square of the tracking error
(ISE) corresponding to both output angles. The smaller the ISE indexes are, the better the
control performance is. Rows 4 and 5 correspond to the cumulative degradation for both
actuators (tail/main) at the end of simulation.
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TABLE 6.8: List of MPC parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Prediction horizon Hp 80 [s]
Control horizon Hc 4 [s]
Maintenance horizon HM 2 [years]
Sampling time Ts 0.015 [s]
Simulation time Tsim 1 [h]
Tracking weights µ1/ µ2 1
Control effort weights α1/ α2
Control effort variation weights ρ1/ ρ2
Upper control efforts u1max/u2max 12 [V ]
Lower control efforts u1mim/u2mim -12 [V ]
Degradation threshold zth1 1
Degradation threshold zth2 1
Degradation rate γ1 1.1 · 10−11
Degradation rate γ2 2.7 · 10−10
TABLE 6.9: Case study parameters
Case ρ1 ρ2 α1 α2 Deg. constraint
1 0 0 0 0 No
2 0 0 0 0 Yes
3 1/120 1/120 1/120 1/120 Yes
4 1/1000 1/120 1/1000 1/120 Yes
TABLE 6.10: Performance evaluation
Case 1 2 3 4
ISE Θh 20.2395 20.2317 21.9480 21.5749
ISE Θv 1.4016 1.4246 1.1740 1.1289
Zh cum. (·10−4) 0.0305 0.0307 0.0261 0.0266
Zv cum. (·10−4) 0.4434 0.4390 0.3109 0.3114
Case 1 corresponds to a neutral MPC control, because it does not take into account the
degradation constraint, and only tracking errors are penalized in the cost function. As a
result, control performance is good, but the main motor degradation at Tsim is higher in
comparison to the other cases.
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FIGURE 6.24: Response of azimuth and pitch angles for Case 1.













































FIGURE 6.25: Response of azimuth and pitch angles for Case 2.
In Case 2, the degradation constraint is taken into account and the main motor degrada-
tion is not allowed to exceed the maximum threshold before the maintenance horizon. As
a consequence the pitch control performance is degraded (i.e., ISE increases), but degra-
dation is reduced (i.e., cumulative z decreases).
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FIGURE 6.26: Response of azimuth and pitch angles for Case 3.

















































FIGURE 6.27: Response of azimuth and pitch angles for Case 4.
In Cases 3 and 4, the degradation process is also taken into account in the cost function.
In Case 3 both control inputs are equally weighted in the cost function, whereas in Case 4
the weighting factors corresponding to the tail motor are smaller. The idea is to penalize
the actuator that exhibits a bigger degradation coefficient, which in this case corresponds
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FIGURE 6.28: Degradation process, a) Horizontal plane, b) Vertical plane.
to the main motor. As a result, the main motor degradation is delayed even further away
from the maintenance horizon (i.e., its cumulative degradation is reduced). However,
some care must be taken when choosing the weighting factors since control performance
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could be deteriorated.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has presented Health-Aware control methodologies based on MPC and LQR
algorithms. The first methodology aims to finding the most important components (the
actuators in this case) based on the study of the RIMs. To achieve that, and as contribution
of this, a methodology to tune the MPC cost function weights that provide best system
reliability and control performance has been proposed. To handle the reliability in the
optimization problem of the MPC controller, an study on different RIMs and their com-
binations has been carried out as part of a global approach. Moreover, a local approach
that considers an equivalent contribution of component reliability to system reliability,
has been studied.
The overall system reliability assessment was done using the methodology presented
in Section 4.2.5, based in determining the minimal path sets, which is known to be an
NP-hard problem when applied to complex system with high amount of components.
Nevertheless, the DBN model may be build from other methods based on a top down
analysis avoiding the specification of all path sets.
This approach was illustrated through an application on a DWN. The use of reliability
measures is useful in identifying the relative importance of each actuator (pump) into
the DWN with respect to the overall reliability of the system. The objective was to ex-
tend the uptime of the system by delaying, as much as possible the system reliability
decrease. Another contribution is that the reliability assessment and RIMs computation
were performed on-line using a DBN.
The results have demonstrated the effectiveness of the methodology. Those results show
that the reliability importance measures provide better system reliability. It is worth to
mention that there is a trade-off between control and reliability objectives. Such trade-off
has been studied and a methodology to handle it has been proposed.
The second approach consist in a LQR tuning methodology based on the Birnbaum’s reli-
ability importance measure. The aim is to perform the control of the system and preserve
its reliability by distributing the control efforts among the actuators based on their im-
portance to the system reliability. The tuning method uses the information about system
and actuators reliabilities and their importance as a policy to adjust the gain matrixRLQR
accordingly.
As a key contribution, in this methodology the system reliability block diagram has been
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obtained from the system controllability analysis. At least 4 rotors are required to assure
system controllability. Therefore, the minimal path sets have been determined based on
those 4-rotor configurations that guarantee system controllability.
Simulation results demonstrates the validity of this approach in terms of reliability and
controllability of the octorotor through an effective health management of the UAV actu-
ators.
Also, a third approach was presented. A degradation model has been taken into account
into the design of a HAC. Results have shown that actuator degradation can be delayed
not only by including a degradation constraint but also by properly tuning the control
input weighting factors in the MPC cost function. This strategy has been applied to a
Twin Rotor MIMO system showing that despite the presence of some system couplings,
the control performance of this multivariate system is clearly affected by the health-aware
control strategy. Hence, the challenge was to design a HAC scheme that delayed actuator
degradation but guaranteed control performance. It has been shown that satisfying these
objectives was possible.
Regarding the failure rate modeling, a review of different models used in the literature
has been presented. Although a model of failure rate which considers the cumulative
usage of the actuators over time has been chosen, other models could be applied, e.g.
based on control effort variations. In that case, appropriate weights in the cost function
could be set to improve the system reliability by making those variations softer.
Chapter 7
Reliability Interpretations
This chapter presents a comparison between two different reliability
interpretations within a Health-Aware Control framework: instanta-
neous and expected reliability. These reliability interpretations concern
the way how reliability is evaluated and how it is considered to evolve
along time. The system reliability performance under both approaches
is compared in a control strategy applied to a DWN.
7.1 Reliability interpretations
In this Chapter, a discussion of the work presented in [141], where two reliability inter-
pretations were studied will be addressed. The first one corresponds to the concept of
reliability which has been applied until now in this thesis. It considers that the reliability







which is a function of time and its failure rate, that is assumed to follow a defined function
based on the Proportional Hazard Models (Section 3.2.1).
This reliability is a monotonically decreasing function of time and it is computed at each
sampling time. Remark that the Ri(0) = 1 and that at each time instant t > 0 the reli-
ability decreases according to its failure rate (6.1) (see Figure 7.1(a)). Let this reliability
interpretation be refereed as the instantaneous reliability.
Generally, the objective in reliability optimization is to achieve higher levels of reliabil-
ity at the end of the mission time Ri(TM ) (Figure 7.1(b)), which is the probability that
component i is able to satisfy its function at the end of the mission TM , denoted as:
Ri(TM ) = e−
∫ TM
0 λi(v)dv ∀ i = 1, . . . , p. (7.1)
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The other reliability interpretation considers that the reliability of an asset or a system is
computed at a given time τ ∈ [0, TM ] [20]. Then, (3.9) becomes:




λi(v)dv ∀ i = 1, . . . , p. (7.2)
(a) (b)
(c)
FIGURE 7.1: Reliability representation: (a) reliability evolution over time
Ri(t), (b) reliability at time TM Ri(TM ), (c) reliability evolution from time
τ until time TM Rτi (TM ).
This implies that Rτi (τ) = 1 at current time (Figure 7.1(c)) and it means that an asset or
system remains fully reliable as long as it is not affected by a fault. Moreover, its reliability
at mission time TM evaluated at current time τ is denoted as:




λτi (v)dv ∀ i = 1, . . . , p (7.3)
where λτi (t) is the failure profile of the ith asset determined at time τ using (6.1) and
Rτi (TM ) denotes the reliability at the end of the mission time TM computed at time instant
τ (see Figure 7.2).
Let the second reliability interpretation be refereed as the expected reliability. Assume that
the component can be characterized at instant time τ by a constant failure rate in the time
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FIGURE 7.2: Expected reliability of the asset Rτi (TM ).
interval [τ, TM ]. Hence, the corresponding reliability of the asset becomes:
Rτi (TM ) = e−λ
τ
i ×(TM−τ) ∀ i = 1, . . . , p (7.4)
where λi(τ) is the ith asset failure rate computed at time τ .
Regarding system reliability, under the first interpretation it will be called the instanta-
neous system reliability, denoted as RS(t). Under the second interpretation it will be called
the expected system reliability, denoted as RτS(TM ).
The Reliability Importance Measure (RIM) should be expressed accordingly with the ex-
pected reliability interpretation as it is presented below.
7.1.1 Importance reliability measures
As presented in Section 4.4, to measure and quantify the impact of asset failures over the
functioning of the system, several indicators concerning reliability importance have been
proposed, each of them with a particular purpose [79].
For instance, the Birnbaum’s importance measure IBi defined in (4.24) quantifies the max-
imum decrease of system reliability due to reliability changes of the ith actuator.
According to both reliability interpretations, two Birnbaum’s measures are proposed. On
the one hand, under the instantaneous reliability interpretation, the asset Birnbaum’s
importance measure will be computed as in (4.24), whereas under the expected reliability




= RτS(1i, TM )−RτS(0i, TM ) (7.5)
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which denotes the asset Birnbaum’s importance measure at mission time instant TM com-
puted at current time τ .
7.1.2 Redistribution policy
The redistribution policy discussed in Section 6.3.3 which is based on the actuators RIMs
is now used to compare both reliability interpretations (i.e., instantaneous and expected).
The MPC technique facilitates the implementation of a Health-Aware Control and the
exploration of different redistribution policies without significant changes in the control
algorithm.
Five scenarios are proposed setting a different weight (ρi) under the two reliability inter-
pretations.
In the first scenario actuator reliability is targeted. Accordingly, ρi is set under the instan-
taneous reliability interpretation as follows:
ρi(k) = 1−Ri(k). (7.6)
In the first scenario, the instantaneous reliability interpretation is assumed.
In the second scenario the overall system reliability is targeted using the Birnbaum’s im-
portance measure. Accordingly, ρi is set under the instantaneous reliability interpretation
as follows:
ρi(k) = IBi(k). (7.7)
Similarly, under the expected reliability interpretation, the third scenario corresponds to:
ρi(k) = 1−Rki (kf ) (7.8)
and the fourth scenario to:
ρi(k) = IkBi(kf ) (7.9)
where kf is the end of mission sample, corresponding to TM .
In the fifth weight assignment, which is common for both reliability interpretations, no
reliability feedback is taken into account, i.e., ρi(k) = 1.
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7.1.3 Performance evaluation
In addition to the cumulative control effort index (Ucum) new indices are defined next,
which will be used in assessing the health-aware control performance under both relia-
bility interpretations.
Definition 7.1. The Cumulative System Reliability indices indicate the aggregated sys-
tem reliability over the mission time.











Rks (kf ). (7.11)
A higher value indicates a better management of the assets reliabilities with the objective
of improving the overall system reliability.
7.2 Drinking Water Network example
Both reliability interpretations will be compared on an application to the DWN presented
in Section 6.3.4. The objective is to apply the MPC HAC methodology to maintain the
pumps and tanks within their bounds and extend the reliability of the system. The cost
function used in this example is (6.12) with ε = 0, and the failure rate of the pumps is
computed using (6.8) in accordance with the reliability interpretation.
The parameters of the simulation are presented in Table 7.1.
Figure 7.3 shows the instantaneous system reliability in the scenario where no reliabil-
ity feedback method is applied (ρi = 1) where the overall system reliability presents a
gradual decreasing behavior, which is characteristic of the instantaneous reliability inter-
pretation. This is the nominal scenario and will be compared with the results of the other
ρi settings.
To illustrate how reliability behaves under the expected reliability interpretation, the re-
liability computed at each sampling time were projected τ + TM hours into the future.
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TABLE 7.1: Simulation parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Prediction horizon Hp 24 [h]
Control horizon Hc 8 [h]
Sampling time Ts 1 [h]
Component parameter βi 10−2 ∀ i ∈ [1, 10]
Upper control bound ui
0.75 0.75 0.75 1.20 0.85
[m3/s]
1.60 1.70 0.85 1.70 1.60
Lower control bound ui 0 ∀ i ∈ [1, 10] [m3/s]
Baseline failure rate λ0i
9.85 10.70 10.50 1.40 0.85
[h−1 · 10−4]
0.80 11.70 0.60 0.74 0.78
Upper state bound xi 65200 3100 14450 11745 [m3]
Lower state bound xi 25000 2200 5200 3500 [m3]
Initial states xi(0) 45100 2650 9825 7622 [m3]








FIGURE 7.3: Instantaneous overall system reliability profile evolution with
ρi = 1.
Some of those values are presented in Figure 7.4, where the overall system reliability
computed at τ = 1, 500, 1000, 1500, and 2000 hours is projected into the future.
Next, Figure 7.5 presents the expected overall system reliability evolution at time instant
TM , which consists of the values of each system reliability projection at TM computed at
each sampling time. In this case, the reliability starts from a value between 0 and less
than 1 and moves towards 1.
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FIGURE 7.4: Expected overall system reliability profile evolution at differ-
ent time instants with ρi = 1.









FIGURE 7.5: Expected system reliability at mission time TM = 2000h evo-
lution with ρi = 1.
7.2.1 Reliabilities comparison
The five scenarios proposed in Section 7.1.2 have been considered in the MPC control of
the DWN. All cases will be assessed under both cumulative reliability indices (7.10) and
(7.11).
Figure 7.6 shows the instantaneous system reliability evolution for the five scenarios.
Remark that the most suitable policies that improve system reliability are those based on
the Birnbaum’s measure.
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FIGURE 7.6: Instantaneous system reliability.
Figure 7.7 provides the expected system reliability at the end of the mission time TM for
the five scenarios. Again the best results correspond to those based on the Birnbaum’s
measure.










FIGURE 7.7: Expected system reliability at mission time tf .
The reliability performance indices were also computed for each scenario and are pre-
sented in Table 7.2.
The performance indices confirm that the best reliability performance is attained when
using a redistribution policy based on the Birnbaum’s importance measure, i.e., (7.7) and
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TABLE 7.2: Reliability performance indexes.
ρi(k) RScum [·106] R
kf
Scum [·106] Ucum [·106]
1 5.6131 5.5583 1.5370
1−Ri(k) 5.4046 5.4054 1.9687
1−Rki (kf ) 5.4525 5.4340 1.9002
IBi(k) 6.1006 6.1653 3.2158
IkBi(kf ) 6.0915 6.1447 3.5040
(7.9), with a small improvement when the instantaneous reliability interpretation is fol-
lowed, i.e., (7.7). Focusing on actuator reliability (i.e., (7.6) and (7.8)) does not optimize
system reliability. However, targeting system reliability leads to a greater actuator energy
expenditure.
To illustrate the performance of the control algorithm, tank volumes for the best redistri-
bution policy, corresponding to (7.7), are presented in Figure 7.8. Note that, the DWN is
able to supply the required water demand maintaining tank volumes within the specified
bounds.











FIGURE 7.8: Tank volumes corresponding to ρi(k) = IBi(k).
And the pump control actions corresponding to the policy given in (7.7) are presented in
Figure 7.9. Note that the control actions evolve in time according to the importance of
each actuator, which change dynamically as their reliabilities change.
Remark that in this scenario, the cost function which computes the control actions does
not take into account any tracking objective. Therefore, tank volumes freely evolve within
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FIGURE 7.9: Pump commands corresponding to ρi(k) = IBi(k).
their bounds.
7.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, two reliability interpretations have been presented and illustrated using
a DWN system. Both approaches have been applied to a Health-Aware Control scheme
based on an MPC algorithm with the objective of improving system reliability.
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The study of two different interpretations of reliability were presented. This study was
done due to the need of clarify what is meant by reliability in both cases and what it is
obtained by using each of those interpretations.
The results of the redistribution policy provide similar results in terms of reliability en-
hancement independently of the reliability interpretation. Thus, both interpretations are
virtually equivalent.
This Chapter aims to illustrate another interpretation of the reliability. It is not intended
to do the same experimentations done in the previous chapter where different weighting
criteria were compared, and only one RIM was used in the experiment. Moreover, an-
other RIMs or a mix of them can give better results in terms of reliability improvement,
as it was demonstrated in the previous chapter.
Moreover, by applying both of them results coincide in determining that the Birnbaum’s





Conclusions and future work
This thesis has proposed some contributions to the field of HAC sys-
tems based on MPC and LQR techniques. This chapter summarizes the
contributions presented in this thesis, review the main conclusions, and
explore the possibilities of further research.
8.1 Conclusions
PHM and HAC methodologies can be implemented on dynamical systems, allowing to
improve the system safety and reduce costs in maintenance, shutdowns, and repairs.
They have been studied during the last decades, and several results have been presented
in the literature. However, there are still some aspects for further research, and this thesis
has been devoted to the progress of the state-of-the-art in this field.
The key contributions of the research work in this thesis are:
• An overview on HAC methodologies and reliability modeling, contributes to clar-
ify concepts like reliable control, FTC, HAC among others, which are often used
indistinctly, sometimes in a wrong way.
• A design methodology of HAC schemes based on MPC and LQR techniques. It has
been shown how the use of RIMs are valuable to identify the relative importance of
each actuator with regarding the overall reliability of the system.
This framework takes into account the usage of the actuators to preserve overall
system reliability while maximizing control performance by means of tuning the
cost function weights of an MPC. Two approaches have been compared, the first
one, called “local approach” is focused on preserving only the actuators reliability,
and the second one, called “global approach”, uses the RIMs.
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The results showed that the local approach, which considers an equivalent contri-
bution of component reliability to system reliability is not the best method in terms
of improving the overall system reliability, instead, the global approach results in
better levels of reliability. This can be explained, to the fact that reliability has mul-
tiple dependencies, for instance, it depends on how much a particular actuator is
used and also it has dependencies between actuators systems due to its localization
within the system.
• Regarding the use of RIMs to tune the MPC algorithm, a comparison of them has
been presented through an example in the DWN system. The results, provide better
results by using combined RIMs.
• Also, a study of the multi-objective cost function has been presented. This study
showed that a trade-off between the objectives has to be taken into account. To
manage this trade-off, a methodology for selecting the optimal weights in the cost
function has been presented.
• As a key contribution, the overall system reliability has been obtained by study-
ing its link with the system controllability. An example on a UAV was presented,
it stands that at least 4 rotors are required to assure the controllability of the sys-
tem. Hence, the minimal path sets have been determined based on those 4-rotor
configurations.
• A review of failure rate modeling used in the literature was done. As a result,
a better-suited model of failure rate which considers the aggregated usage of the
actuators and the time of life, was proposed.
• An study of two reliability interpretations have been presented and illustrated on
a DWN system. Both approaches have been applied to the HAC scheme based on
an MPC algorithm with the objective of improving system reliability presented in
Chapter 6. Results show that both interpretations provide similar criteria concern-
ing how MPC should be properly tuned in a HAC scheme.
8.2 Perspectives and future work
This research work can also be extended by exploring the following ideas:
• Explore other control methodologies to implement an HAC. In such a way, a feed-
back controller synthesizing approach based on Linear Matrix Inequalities (LIMs)
could be considered as it was already proposed in [74].
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• An open issue that requires further research is the procedure to obtain a cost func-
tion that can include other terms for its minimization and maintain its simplicity,
due that nonlinear optimization cost function is computationally heavy and could
lead to non-implementable control schemes. Therefore, it could be interesting to
have an explicit system reliability expression into the MPC cost function, neverthe-
less, it would lead to a nonlinear MPC (NLMPC) implementation. Therefore, the
NLMPC drawbacks should be taken into account.
• Special attention must be paid to the determination of the minimal path sets since
their meaning depends on the system, and the objectives to be addressed. For in-
stance, in DWNs a minimal path set is the set of actuators whose functioning sat-
isfies the demands, i.e., they connect the demands with the sources. On the other
hand, in the UAV system, a minimal path set is the set of actuators whose func-
tioning guarantees the controllability of the system. Thus, further research should
be done in studying different interpretation for the minimal path sets for other sys-
tems.
• The reliability analysis of the DWN systems can be extended to consider not only
the topological reliability but also the hydraulic one. This can be a challenge be-
cause information of the availability of the water supplies is needed in advance
and a precise forecast of the water consumption will be also required.
• The computation of the overall system reliability can result in an NP-hard problem
in a complex system with high amount of components. This quantity of compo-
nents could lead to a high amount of minimal path sets (amps) incrementing the
amount of terms in the structure function by 2amps − 1. One solution could be the
use of an approximation of the system reliability, such as the upper or lower relia-
bility bounds [47]. Nevertheless, the use of this approach could not be the solution
to this problem, and more research should be done.
• An open challenge is to apply the proposed methodology to real systems. Nev-
ertheless, the slow decrease on reliability makes it difficult to obtain results in a
reasonably fast way.
• Regarding the attempts to address the problem of HAC, a list of applications and
control techniques used were given. However, the problem of how to include the
system health information in the controller design in a systematic way is still an
open research topic to explore and dedicate more research.
• The right health indicator to be used for reconfiguring/accommodating the con-
troller is also a key issue. Some methodologies for the designer should be given in
order to facilitate the design of the HAC reconfiguration/accommodation strategy.
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• Other functions to model the failure rate could be used, e.g. the failure rate can
be a function of the control effort variations. In that case, appropriate weights in
the cost function can be used to improve the reliability by making those variations
softer. Evidently, the modeling of the failure rate depends on the nature of the
component to be modeled and the environment where it is used.
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